Restoring public trust in our police force
A short period of relative calm has followed weeks of tumultuous debate about the accountability of An Garda Síochána. It’s time to take a step back from the highly-politicised exchanges and ask some serious questions about the systemic failings that have been exposed.
The job of holding An Garda Síochána to account is shared by a number of entities, including the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission (GSOC); (until recently) the confidential recipient; the minister for justice,& and the Garda commissioner.
What has been the real impact on the credibility of each of these offices of the recent revelations? And where should we go from here to restore public trust?
GSOC replaced a Garda Síochána complaints board on which the Garda commissioner (or his delegate) had a seat. Solicitors routinely advised their clients simply to sue the Garda Commissioner for civil damages rather than engage in protracted and usually fruitless proceedings before the board. GSOC was big step forward and is still a much more impressive mechanism than can be found in most other jurisdictions.
However, recent events have starkly highlighted shortcomings in the 2005 legislation under which GSOC was created. In particular, the fact that GSOC cannot probe complaints regarding the Garda Commissioner is now widely seen as a major lacuna.
Oliver Connolly, a barrister and accredited mediator has reportedly given whistleblowers advice such as “if Shatter thinks you’re screwing him, you’re finished”.
He has been sacked and his office is to be abolished. In future, we are told, whistleblowers will be directed to GSOC. But will people brave enough to break ranks really have confidence in a body with no powers to investigate complaints against their ultimate boss?
The protective attitude displayed towards Alan Shatter by his party and Coalition colleagues is more than just political damage limitation. There is genuine cross-party respect for his abilities. Mr Shatter is a skilled lawyer and highly diligent minister who has shown himself unafraid to take on vested interests and happy to debunk sanctimonious opposition to progressive legislation.
So why has he felt compelled to spend hour after hour engaging in painstakingly forensic rebuttals of the smallest details? How can this possibly be a good use of the time of a reforming minister whose particular skills are needed to ensure the smooth adoption of a lengthening backlog of complex legislation?
At least a partial answer lies in the nature of the relationship between the Garda Commissioner and the minister. The Garda Act 2005 empowers the minister to set out “policy priorities” for the gardaí in performing its functions and to issue “written directives” to the Commissioner. It requires the Garda commissioner to submit three-year strategy statements to the minister for approval that must take account of, among other factors, “relevant government policy”. Moreover, the Garda Commissioner must submit annual policing plans to the minister for approval.
Clearly, what is missing from Garda accountability structures is civic oversight in the form of an independent policing authority such as the Policing Board in Northern Ireland. An independent Garda authority could also have an oversight role in issues such as the allocation of Garda contracts, management performance, the setting of clear performance goals to which the Garda Commissioner would be accountable on an annual basis, and the appointment of senior Garda officers.
Once established, it could play a role in setting priorities and monitoring compliance with human rights principles. With the input and consultation of the commissioner, it could also draw up the strategic and annual policing plans. The commissioner could then be held accountable by the authority, not by a politician, for the performance of his or her functions in accordance with the strategy plan and annual plan.
Some of the commissioner’s recent pronouncements have seemed more autocratic than authoritative.
He has qualified the conduct of two high-profile whistleblowers as “disgusting” and declined a parliamentary opportunity to withdraw that remark. Another recent comment that the “pigeons had come home to roost” at GSOC could be interpreted as an after-the-fact justification for the reported failure of senior officers to co-operate fully with intelligence- sensitive GSOC inquiries. Present legal arrangements position the minister as a political shield for the commissioner and exclude the force’s most senior officer from GSOC’s investigative mandate. It’s clear this should change.
Set against the breadth of Garda-related accountability concerns that have surfaced over the past few weeks, it cannot be said that the Government’s response is adequate. Of the three reviews (not inquiries) proposed, none will have the power to compel witnesses or carry out on-the-spot investigations.
Retired Judge John Cooke’s terms of reference effectively invite him to examine whether or not GSOC had good reason to believe it was bugged. Seán Guerin, an experienced prosecution barrister, has been appointed to examine only the whistleblowing allegations of Sergeant Maurice McCabe, with a view to recommending whether or not an independent inquiry into those allegations is required. Quite why such a determination could not be made right now, by the minister for Justice on the advice of the Attorney General, remains obscure.
Perhaps the best hope for recommendations on the systemic reforms that are needed lies in the Oireachtas Committee on Justice, which has been invited to review the operation of the Garda Act 2005. None of these reviews is likely to bring us closer to the underlying truth about whether GSOC has been bugged, whistleblowers discouraged, and Garda investigations mishandled. The Government should act now, before further allegations emerge, to establish a fully independent inquiry under the Commissions of Investigation Act 2004.
* Mark Kelly is the director of the Irish Council for Civil Liberties
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