Would earth be better without humans?

If we did not exist we would not suffer. With population growth unsustainable, perhaps it is morally wrong to continue having children, says Professor Tom Moore

THE birth of Danica May Camacho, a girl, in Manila, the Philippine capital, on October 31 last year was chosen by the UN to symbolically mark the seven billionth person.

If the South African philosopher Professor David Benatar had his way, there would be no people, and no life on any other planet.

This extraordinary view leads to conclusions many will find repugnant: that coming into existence is harmful; that procreation is morally wrong; that it is wrong not to abort foetuses in early pregnancy; that it would be better if humanity became extinct. Because an idea appears counter-intuitive, even repugnant, does not mean it should be dismissed without dispassionate examination, particularly when the author is a widely cited academic. Recall that the majority once believed that the Earth was flat and orbited by the sun.

In his book, Better Never To Have Been: The Harm Of Coming Into Existence, Prof Benatar says the birth of a baby creates a new ‘centre of suffering’ and that procreation is morally wrong. Benatar is a moral philosopher and not all of his arguments will be familiar, or even comprehensible, to the lay reader (including this one). Nevertheless, I urge interested readers to go to the original source.

Benatar has identified an asymmetry in quality of life between individuals brought into existence and those that are not. An individual brought into existence — you and I — will experience pleasure and pain. Benatar says not procreating abolishes the suffering associated with existence, and those who do not exist are not deprived of life’s pleasures.

The latter point is critical to his argument: non-existent individuals cannot be deprived of pleasure (if you don’t exist, you cannot miss out). Therefore, non-existence is preferable to existence because if you exist you will suffer, whereas non-existence abolishes pain and (again) does not deprive the non-existent individual of pleasure.

Benatar’s argument may seem a poor basis for proposing the non-existence of all sentient beings. However, his book contains a detailed working-through of the implications of his argument and a discussion of opposing views.

Having begun the book sceptically, I found I was persuaded within the limits of my ability to comprehend his more detailed and specialist philosophical arguments. Anyone can appreciate the core of his argument as outlined above and as detailed in chapter two of his book.

Benatar says his argument does not apply to existing individuals (you and I !), but only to the decision about bringing new individuals into existence.

Therefore, you will be relieved to hear that he does not advocate homicide, suicide, or other methods of hurrying existing individuals to their inevitable ‘reward.’ He also acknowledges the difficulty of implementing a programme of planned human extinction without causing ancillary suffering to existing individuals, particularly those few present in the latter stages of the existence of the human species.

Benatar is realistic about the prospects of his argument influencing current human reproductive practice: “Procreation will continue undeterred, causing a vast amount of harm.”

The strong biological and psychological drives that we humans inherited from our ape-like ancestors mean that our innate impulses towards personal survival, reproduction, optimism, and (according to a recent book by Robert Trivers) self-deception are unlikely to be reversed by Benatar’s logic.

It may be that his arguments will filter more subtly into people’s thinking.

For example, as he says, there is a strong pro-natal bias in society. I have read of women who choose not to have children being subjected to the subtle (and, perhaps, not so subtle) disapprobation of their peers. Also, Benatar’s argument speaks strongly to the highly sensitive and fraught issue of knowingly bringing severely disabled children into existence.

I recall hearing, some years ago, possibly during a debate on contraception or abortion, an audience member challenge a panel member as to which of his children he regretted having.

This was a clever debating strategy that has relevance to Benatar’s argument. How many of us are prone to not only imagining a future for our existing children, but also — particularly on consciously deciding to have a first or an additional child — to imagining futures for currently non-existent children? Non-existent children are, er, non-existent. I don’t wake every morning to accusing stares from the three, 300, 3,000... children that I never had (the accusing stares from the ones I did have are more than sufficient).

It is increasingly apparent that the human population is approaching an unsustainable level of over-consumption of non-renewable resources and ensuing environmental degradation.

Over the past century, science, technology and education have risen to the challenge in the West, but many in the Third World routinely bear the brunt of unrestrained human population growth, and over-consumption in the West.

These issues are not central, but neither are they irrelevant to Benatar’s argument, as their combined force suggests that voluntary restraint in respect of personal reproduction may be necessary, and certainly preferable to a totalitarian approach to controlling population growth, or to famine.

It appears to be well-established that education of teenage girls is a key component of any strategy that aims to reduce population growth, and Benatar’s arguments seem to me to be relevant to putting a brake on the strong pro-natal psychological and cultural biases that exist in many societies.

Those with religious beliefs will have their own set of criteria as to what constitutes a worthwhile life, and Benatar touches only briefly on how religious beliefs and practices intersect with his argument. His views are largely irrelevant if you have a religious conviction that over-rules his presumption that quality of life is to be measured exclusively during your tenure here on Earth.

Speaking of other-worldly considerations, it is interesting to speculate on the possible strategies that might be adopted by a highly morally and intellectually developed alien species that had incorporated Benatar’s alien equivalent’s arguments into their worldview.

Should we expect these Mr Spock-like creatures (let’s call them the Benatars) to capitulate to their own unerring logic and pursue their own extinction forthwith.

Alternatively, being highly morally developed, might they be expected to agonisingly forego the benefits of their own extinction in order to help less-advanced species like ourselves to achieve the same end? (Beware Death Stars sent by friendly aliens).

Come to think of it, do we not have a similar moral imperative to forego our own extinction (for the greater galactic good) in order to develop intra-galactic travel, Death Stars, and boldly go....? Hmmm.

* Dr Tom Moore is a senior lecturer, department of biochemistry, UCC.