Ireland does not need an arms industry — it needs capability

Is Ireland willing to invest steadily in the technological, cyber, industrial and maintenance capabilities that allow a small state to remain independent, asks Paul Davis

As more of our public and private systems move online, cyber resilience becomes a question of sovereignty. A state cannot rely entirely on outsourced capability in a crisis; it needs a domestic base of expertise that can advise, interpret and act when things go wrong.

Ireland is finally, if somewhat reluctantly, having a proper conversation about defence again.

For years, the subject sat at the edge of political life, treated as awkward, expensive, and best kept at arm’s length. 

Neutrality often became a way of saying very little needed to be done. We assumed that if we needed something, we could simply buy it from somewhere else.

That assumption is no longer good enough.

Ireland is operating in a far more unsettled world than it did even a decade ago. Undersea cables now carry huge amounts of global traffic. 

Cyberattacks can knock out hospitals, utilities, and public services. Supply chains are less reliable. Drones have changed the way power is projected. 

Even information itself is now contested. Yet too much of our thinking about defence still sounds like a purchasing exercise — find the cheapest compliant option, sign the contract, move on. 

That may work for office equipment, but it does not work for national security.

This is not an argument for building a traditional military-industrial complex. Ireland is not going to become a weapons-manufacturing state, nor should it try. 

But that is not the same as saying we should remain dependent on others for the expertise and systems that underpin our own security. 

There is a real difference between avoiding militarisation and accepting weakness.

At the moment, Ireland imports not just equipment but, increasingly, the skills needed to operate, maintain, and adapt that equipment. That is where the vulnerability lies. 

Loss of domestic knowledge and capability is a big risk

For a small state, the biggest risk is often not the absence of hardware; it is the loss of domestic knowledge and capability. 

You can buy a radar system, but you cannot buy the years of experience needed to interpret what it is telling you. 

You can contract cybersecurity support, but you cannot outsource sovereign judgement in the middle of a live crisis. 

You can acquire surveillance tools, but you cannot instantly create the institutional memory needed to use them well.

That is why the defence debate here needs to mature. The future of Irish capability will not look like arms production. 

It will sit instead at the intersection of technology, cyber security, infrastructure resilience, aerospace support, software, and advanced maintenance. 

In some ways, the ingredients are already here. Ireland has strong positions in software, aviation leasing and maintenance, data infrastructure, pharmaceuticals, and advanced manufacturing. 

These are not usually discussed in defence terms, but many of them have clear strategic value.

Cyber resilience is a question of sovereignty

Cyber security is the clearest example. As more of our public and private systems move online, cyber resilience is no longer just a technical issue for IT teams. It is a question of sovereignty. 

A state cannot rely entirely on outsourced capability in a crisis; it needs a domestic base of expertise that can advise, interpret and act when things go wrong.

The same is true at sea. Ireland’s Atlantic position gives it real strategic importance, especially in relation to undersea cables, offshore energy, and digital connectivity. 

Protecting those assets does not mean building submarines or destroyers. It does mean developing our own strength in maritime sensing, unmanned systems, secure communications, data analysis, and infrastructure monitoring. 

The same logic applies to defence aviation. We do not need fighter jets or weapons factories, but we do have a strong aviation sector, and that could support the maintenance and sustainment of surveillance aircraft, transport aircraft, and maritime patrol capability.

The central point is simple: capability takes time to build. Once it is lost, it is very hard to recover. 

Skills ecosystems cannot be created overnight, and institutional memory cannot be bought back at short notice.

What capabilities must remain inside the State?

That is why we need to move beyond a narrow view of procurement. Traditional procurement asks what is cheapest today. 

Strategic planning asks something more difficult: what capabilities must remain inside the State, even if they seem inefficient in the short term? 

Those are not the same question, and they do not lead to the same answer.

None of this is an argument against value for money, oversight, or accountability. It is an argument against confusing short-term savings with long-term strength. 

Ireland has a habit of outsourcing complexity while keeping the responsibility. We have seen that in infrastructure, in digital systems, and in large public projects. 

Over time, the State has often lost the ability to challenge suppliers, assess risk properly, or act independently. Defence simply makes that problem more obvious.

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Other small European states have understood this for some time. 

Finland has built resilience through long-term planning and strong domestic systems integration. Estonia has made cyber security a core part of national sovereignty. 

Denmark has invested heavily in maritime awareness and sensing because geography demands it. None of these countries set out to become military powers.

Ireland must now accept that sovereign capacity is something that has to be built, maintained, and renewed over time.

The real question is not whether Ireland needs an arms industry. It is whether we are willing to invest steadily in the technological, cyber, industrial, and maintenance capabilities that allow a small state to remain independent in practice, not just in theory. 

That is a harder conversation than talking about defence spending. But it is the one we should be having.

• Paul Davis is associate professor of management at DCU