Party merger moves have one thing in common — keep Sinn Féin out

IN THE concluding sentence of his magisterial new history of Ireland from the French revolution to the present day, Professor Paul Bew wonders if, “as ethnic rage gives way to ethnic vanity, is it really possible that the enmities of Irish history are losing their power to hurt and destroy”?

Have we indeed found some reasonably happy — and lasting — equilibrium between the claims of Orange and Green? All sane people would sincerely hope so.

We have indeed arrived at a fortuitous point in our history. The Troubles took a long time to fizzle out and there are still groups out there with murderous intent, but the situation is calmer in the North than at any time in the past 40 years or so. (Let’s not forget that the first deaths were at the hands of the UVF as far back as 1966.)

It’s hardly surprising then that having reached the Promised Land, there is irritation with those who have itchy feet. Some, notably the UUP leader Sir Reg Empey, have criticised any notion of Fianna Fáil organising in Northern Ireland as premature at best and destabilising at worst.

Others have complained about a possible three-way splitting of the nationalist vote.

In fairness to Fianna Fáil, this idea is hardly new: it has been discussed at ard fheiseanna for several years. But Sir Reg does have a point when he says Fianna Fáil could jeopardise its position as an honest broker, but it isn’t as if there aren’t corresponding moves afoot for a realignment within unionism.

A hardline anti-agreement splinter from the DUP seems to be a work in progress while Sir Reg himself has accepted Peter Robinson’s offer of talks about merging their two parties. It could be added that the UUP has long been quietly supportive of moves to establish the British Labour Party in the North, so it’s churlish not to expect nationalists to deepen their corresponding North-South links.

The arguments both for a united unionist party and for a 32-county Fianna Fáil are finely balanced. One big unionist party has been most unionists’ long-held desire. Now that Ian Paisley has reconstructed himself, the big barrier has been removed. Unionism expends a great deal of its resources on infighting when it could be improving grassroots structures. A single mainstream unionist party would also have the benefit of denying Sinn Féin any prospect of becoming the largest party and claiming the First Minister’s office.

Yet, even if unionist politicians could overcome their differences — and that’s a big “if” — a great deal of private polling would be required before finalising any deal. The lesson from the South is that two-plus-two sometimes equals just three. In the 1997 general election, Labour and Democratic Left managed 12.9% of the vote and 21 seats between them. In the two subsequent general elections, following the merger of the two parties, that slipped to a mere 10.8% and 10.1%, respectively, and just 20 seats. The absence of fighting on the non-sectarian left didn’t lead to any improvement in the enlarged Labour Party’s performance.

The question is then: do unionist divisions really turn voters off, as is often claimed? Would very liberal unionists vote for a party led by Ian Paisley? Could such a party attract the support of Catholics, the increasing number of people in mixed marriages, and voters who despise “un-British” positions on questions like abortion and gay rights?

Equally, would very hardline voters opt for a party that included, say, Ken Maginnis and Lady Sylvia Hermon? Would a unionist merger just breathe life into a new “ultra” party led by Jim Allister and others who don’t like power sharing — at least with Sinn Féin? Isn’t that the lesson from previous moves to the centre by the likes of Terence O’Neill that gave rise to the DUP in the first place?

And if a merged unionist party turned off voters at either end of the unionist spectrum, following the Labour/DL experience, could the number of unionist voters fall below the number of nationalists? More broadly, what would the impact be if nationalists were effectively denied even the remote chance of taking the top job?

The questions raised by a nationalist realignment are no less profound. In truth, the Social Democratic and Labour Party has long been a misnomer. Much of the working-class element drifted off long ago. The days when SDLP-Fine Gael ties were strong are similarly long since past.

If the remaining pockets of resistance to an SDLP-Fianna Fáil merger in Derry, Belfast and the youth wing can be overcome — the rural members see themselves as a special detachment of the Soldiers of Destiny anyway — an avowedly “constitutional” nationalism could give Sinn Féin a run for its (vast sums of) money.

Such a party would be far better placed to raise funds than the penniless SDLP. (No talk of brown envelopes, carrier bags, briefcases or even wardrobes, please.) It would be a party enlivened by a more modern, European republicanism than practised by the SDLP, let alone Sinn Féin. Further, it would be authentically Irish — unlike the SDLP, which is the unhappy product of an unhappy history — and, at the same time, provide an outlet for Northern Catholics’ nationalism while fully respecting the consent principle. The problem is, of course, that the Good Friday provisions do not allow for a party to be both a friendly persuader for agreement between the Northern tribes (as the sovereign government of Ireland) and an active party to the dispute (as designated nationalists in the assembly).

THE danger is of both communities sharpening their respective identities rather than engaging in the painful work of reconciliation. The Taoiseach’s mention of 2016, the centenary of the Rising, was particularly unhelpful in this context. Unionists’ suspicion that the word “peace” is just Irish for “unity” would be confirmed.

Perhaps ethnic solidarity is all that matters nowadays. That would be a pity. Both these unionist and nationalist realignment projects are fraught with difficulty, but they do have one common objective: the marginalisation of Sinn Féin. Fianna Fáil believes, with good reason, that the electoral threat from that quarter has been thwarted. If SF can’t make progress after a decade sauntering across the southern stage like returning war heroes, against a backdrop of low standards in public life from the “Leinster House parties”, when can it?

How Sinn Féin will react to what it will see as the establishment parties ganging up against it is anyone’s guess. For now, it can console itself with its pre-eminent position in Northern nationalism. But the failure of its wider project is abundantly clear. The border has been smudged, but no more than that. As for Gerry Adams’ long-argued “southern strategy”, it lies in tatters.

As recently as five years ago, Adams might have confidently aspired to becoming president of Ireland one day. Not any more. To add insult to injury, it’s Martin McGuinness who is the focus of attention in the North. It’s McGuinness who is called upon to give the benefit of his conflict resolution experiences to the Iraqis. Adams is reduced to writing travel pieces for The Guardian newspaper. How the mighty have fallen! I will spare you my crocodile tears.