Making a point a dangerous game

Recent history in tournament football suggests accepting a draw in the opening game could prove Ireland’s downfall

Iker Casillas was damning.

It was the aftermath of Spain’s Euro 2004 defeat — and elimination — to Portugal and he simply couldn’t excuse yet another poor tournament. The young goalkeeper was as extreme as he was excoriating.

“It was our worst game in Euro 2004 and we just didn’t give what he had to give. We’re going home because we deserve to.”

At the other end of the Spanish camp, though — and, indeed, at the other end of the spectrum — one figure connected to the squad offered an alternative reason.

“Today, we simply paid the price for Portugal’s poor performance against Greece.”

It was undoubtedly an excuse. But that doesn’t mean it wasn’t also a rational explanation.

In that famous opening fixture of Euro 2004, Greece beat Portugal to seemingly set the template for the tournament and, indeed, the final.

Except, when you go back and look at it, they didn’t really. A few facts have been forgotten about that first game.

For one, Greece’s remaining results and performances in the group gradually declined. They drew the next game against Spain before suffering defeat to Russia and only scraping into the last eight — somewhat ironically — on goals scored.

Secondly, the victory over Portugal only came thanks to Greece seizing the opportunity, catching the hosts cold and, all in all, producing a vibrant attacking display they wouldn’t replicate for the rest of the tournament.

As such, that opening win certainly didn’t set the tactical template for Greece’s minimalist tournament. It did, however, provide the platform from which to properly launch it.

By winning the opening game, Greece conditioned the rest of the group.

What the result also did, after all, was alter the dynamics of Portugal’s campaign. By the time they had beaten Russian and had to do the same against Spain, all of the emotional energy around the home team had come to a groundswell. As even Casillas conceded, a Spanish side that only needed a point simply couldn’t play at the same tempo.

“Portugal played with all the passion,” Spanish manager Inaki Saez said.

So, while Spain undoubtedly failed to produce enough vigour, they were still victims of circumstance, to a certain degree.

And it’s a curious thing.

Over the last few weeks and months, we’ve all been discussing quality, form and fatigue as if they will be the only decisive factors in Euro 2012. Just as significant might be the simple arrangement of fixtures. In short, some teams get luckier with how their games lie than others.

Think that’s overstating it? Not in a tournament this short. These are the kind of nuances, after all, that knockout football is open to. And, in a group stage of just three games per team, one unexpected result can have a hugely distorted effect on the dynamics of the pool.

Poor Ivory Coast, meanwhile, have suffered from the fixtures twice. In both the 2006 and 2010 World Cups, they were unlucky they had to play the group favourites before either of their rivals for second place. As such, both the Netherlands and Portugal got the benefit of meeting Argentina and Brazil, respectively, after the latter two had already beaten the Africans and secured qualification — resulting in sedate dead rubbers. The situation might have been completely different — and more anxious — had the fixtures been reversed or Ivory Coast even taken the game to either of the South Americans rather than play for a draw. And therein lies a lesson.

It was Giovanni Trapattoni, of course, who suffered the most notorious bad luck of the draw. Quite literally. The odds have never been shorter for a 2-2 as before Denmark met Sweden in 2004 to oust Italy.

A potential problem for Ireland is that Trapattoni may have been just as unfortunate with this month’s fixtures.

Because, whatever people think about Italy, the simple fact is that Croatia are closest to Ireland in terms of quality, status and form. In short, it’s the most winnable game.

Unfortunately, it also happens to be the first game. Psychological factors like pressure and trepidation tend to ensure the opening match is already the cagiest of any group — something likely to be exaggerated by Trapattoni’s inherent caution.

Convention, of course, also dictates that it’s harmless to accept a draw in your first game in order to secure a foothold in the group.

That, however, is a myth. In the modern, 16-team European Championship competition, 59% of all teams who drew their first game actually went out in the first round.

And, given that Ireland will be unlikely to have a better chance to win a game than their first, they may well add to that figure.

Similarly, should Italy lose to Spain, they may find — as many teams have — that an opening defeat actually fires them. As Felipe Scolari said of Portugal in 2004, “we were bad in the first game so we had to bet everything on the other matches.”

Certainly, if early results conform to expectations, Ireland may well be unfortunate the fixtures didn’t fall in a different way.

As ever in football, though, there’s only one thing you can do when luck seems to go against you: try and affect it rather than leave yourself open to it.

So, while Trapattoni’s system is — of course — absolutely the right option to play Spain and Italy, the exact context of the Croatia game may require a change.

Slaven Bilic certainly thinks so. He’s already talked of altering his side’s counter-attacking game in order to defeat the Irish.

“Ireland is our big chance, but I’m sure they’re saying the same about us,” explains Bilic.

Otherwise, they might be saying the same as the Spanish 2004 squad.