Fatal flaws in FAI, says report
Alistair Gray, who led the Genesis report into the performance and role of the FAI at the recent World Cup, was at pains to stress that the organisation’s officers had excelled in many of their functions in support of the international team but his identification of weaknesses in their arrangements was devastating.
He described the overall planning of the FAI as inadequate and, most critical of all, he suggested the eventual outcome of the exercise on the field of play and commercially was more a matter of luck than effective management practice.
Such a conclusion was remarkable, especially as it reflected on the success of the team. It is true his report paid tribute to the achievements of the team in the context of a suggestion that Irish squads, especially in the last 12 years, have appeared to perform above expectations, in marked contrast to others.
The report suggested most people felt this was due to:
* Strong morale and team spirit - almost like a club.
* Feeling of ’we have nothing to lose’.
* Spirit of fun in the squad and ‘getting on with it’ when in adversity.
* Social relationship with one another and fans.
But in a section headlined Our Overall Findings, the report recorded:
* The size, scale and possible impact of the World Cup were under-estimated.
* Except that carried out by the team management and a number of very capable individuals - both groups were almost in isolation from the FAI.
* The inexperienced working group was too informal in its set-up.
* No formal learning was captured from previous major tournaments.
* The impact of additional workload for the World Cup was not considered.
The working group referred to was set up by the FAI in December, 2001 after qualification had been secured through a play-off with Iran. The report said the FAI recognised the mounting pressure on the group in March, 2002 when two extra members of staff were released to handle commercial opportunities.
The report was critical of the fact the FAI had not agreed a dedicated plan or budget for the World Cup and that no explicit objectives were written down or agreed between the organisation and the team management.
Instead, it suggested it was implicit in their planning to qualify for the second stage, to do as well as possible and to earn a net €1.5m.
It highlighted that the FAI had not set up official structures or processes to meet the planning needs beyond the setting up of the working group.
These were just some of the criticisms levelled against the association but they helped highlight possibly the most serious shortcoming in the administrative body - the lack of continuity in the management of football at all levels in Ireland.
The report referred to the participation of Ireland in previous championship finals - Euro 1988, the World Cups of 1990 and 1994 and identified the successes of Irish teams at other levels in international competition.
Effectively the report says the regular turnover of principals at officer board level meant that the FAI had learned nothing from participation in previous tournaments. All of these criticisms helped to stress the need for the FAI to act on this significant conclusion:
“If the FAI is serious about competing in the world-class of the 21st century it needs to modernise and professionalise to reflect the needs of the 21st century sport and to evolve the voluntary leadership into a professional management structure.”
Interestingly, the report concluded that the choice of Saipan as a preparatory base was excellent for acclimatisation and relaxation. But it added a disproportionately large complexity to logistics by adding a third leg to an already tiring journey.
Howard Wilkinson, then working for the English FA, had been so impressed with the fitness shown by the team in competition that he contacted the FAI to enquire about Saipan.
The report said the pitch and skip incidents were more damaging than the technical impact on the team’s performance and it was critical of the FAI for not supporting the press officer or team management adequately.
Mr Gray said in compiling their report they had conducted 27 interviews with team management, coaches, management, administrators.
Interviews were requested with the 23 players and 14 of them provided interviews with Roy Keane speaking with Mr Gray for 90 minutes.
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