A sense of déjà vu in Ukraine stand-off

The repetitive nature of history is as obvious as our unfortunate inability to break free from the almost predictable cycle of threat and counter threat, calamity and disaster. Some threats fade before wars break out, others, tragically, do not.

This week’s Nato summit in Cardiff, a wonderful combination of extravagance and impotence, was free to reach any conclusion it chose. But how those conclusions might force a resolution of the crisis, a crisis that may become a war, in Ukraine, is an open but ever more pressing question. It is difficult to exaggerate how very high the stakes are, especially as the options available if diplomacy fails are so terribly limited.

The same doubt exists about how those conclusions might secure today’s moment of peace in Gaza, a moment already threatened by another round of Israeli land thefts. Doubt also surrounds how those Cardiff conclusions might limit, much less end, the appalling terror campaigns waged by the butchering mobs that comprise the Islamic State. The only certainty — and it is a tragic certainty — is that no matter which side we are on, there is an unquestionable link between the number of boots on the ground, soldiers or tanks on the streets, and the ability to effectively influence events.

The diplomatic and military game between Russia, Ukraine, Nato and the European Union will hopefully be resolved by a version of Russian president, Vladimir Putin’s peace proposals. However questionable, they are better than an escalation of violence.

That acceptance is reinforced by the reality that Russia was never going to tolerate the increasing westernisation of a country it regards as being within its sphere of influence, and one it regards as buffer zone between it and the repeated invasions from the West. This is a historic reality Nato and Europe set aside rather too easily.

It may be the case too that the West has, as it has done so many times in the past, been testing Russian patience and resolve. If that was the case, then the experiment has cost us — and especially the people of Ukraine — dearly. Not only has the adventure destabilised Ukraine and the modernisation of that country but it has, despite focused economic sanctions, strengthened Putin’s power and popularity considerably. The consequences of this are very hard to quantify. Relations between the West and Russia are damaged to a point where the Cold War has been revived at precisely the moment that Western leaders have squandered so much political capital.

The West’s failed and destructive ambition to try to secure greater influence in Ukraine may have to be balanced by accepting unpalatable peace proposals from Russia. By encouraging Ukraine to assert its independence, the West may have cost Ukraine a considerable degree of its autonomy and territory.

Exactly 70 years ago, Stalin ensured the destruction of Warsaw and the death of thousands of brave Poles — some historians believe 150,000 — by encouraging them to rebel against Nazi occupation, only to withhold promised support until it was too late. Similarly, the West bares considerable responsibility for the deaths of those Ukrainians it encouraged to believe they could turn their back on a reality that has endured for centuries; the reality that Russia is, and is determined to remain, the dominant, unchallenged force in the region. And it is not as if the West did not know that.