The defence of Jadotville: A hiding to nothing

Some of the Irish UN soldiers after the Jadotville siege who held out for five days against overwhelming odds.
The Irish UN contingent sent in to defend the town of Jadotville was on a hiding to nothing, pushed centre-stage into what was essentially a superpower struggle over minerals – the ones extracted from the Congo were vital to the nuclear weapons programmes of Cold War foes the USA and Soviet Union.
Commandant Quinlan's troops were part of a UN force sent to Congo to try and prevent bloodshed after part of the country, Katanga, declared independence.
The Katangese president, Moíse Tshome, saw the value of the minerals, such as Cobalt, to outsiders and was determined to ensure his country (or himself) profited from the mining.
Katanga produced 60% of the world’s cobalt and was the principal source of uranium used for the USA's nuclear arsenal.

The Irish presence at the mining town of Jadotville was something Tshome and the mining companies certainly didn't want. In particular he was supported by Belgium, the main colonial power in the region.
Belgium's King Leopold II had taken over the Congo and between 1891 and 1906 allowed in mining companies, whose extraordinary brutality included genocide, widespread enslavement and mutilations for the minimal of indiscretions, or even just on a whim.
On the morning of Wednesday, September 13, 1961, Katangese forces - backed up by mercenaries from Belgium, France and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) - attacked the Irish troops while they were at mass in Jadotville.

It's estimated there were anything between 3,000 and 5,000 of them. The Irish contingent amounted to a little over 150 men.
Their opposition were well-equipped. They'd artillery and mortars and called in a fighter training jet equipped with machine guns and underwing bombs to hit the Irish positions.
A five-day battle ensued during which the Irish got the upper hand, quickly knocking out the enemy's mortar and artillery positions and cutting down waves of soldiers sent against them.
Commandant Quinlan's tactics were impeccable, and while a few of his men were wounded, none were killed.

A relief force of UN troops - comprising Irish, Swedish and Indian soldiers – battled unsuccessfully to relieve them in time.
Severely outnumbered and with little or no ammunition or food left, the small Irish contingent had little option but to accept a ceasefire offered by the enemy.
They'd no transport to get out of there anyway, as the jet fighter had destroyed their vehicles. The only alternative was to eventually surrender, or face certain death.
They were held as 'prisoners of war' from September 17 to October 24 until the UN finally worked out a deal to get their release.

The troops returned home to a hero's welcome, but that dissipated quickly after the word went out “from the powers-that-be” that their surrender was shameful.
They were shunned by many because of a widespread whispering campaign. It's widely perceived now that the incompetence actually lay with the very people who tried to put the blame on them.
Those who fought in the battle didn't mention it much, if at all afterwards, believing their careers would be in jeopardy if they did.
Comdt Quinlan was eventually promoted to Colonel, but never served on an overseas mission again, which today seems incomprehensible considering his defensive tactics later became textbook material for aspiring military leaders in many other countries.

Dr Edward Burke - director of the Centre for Conflict, Security and Terrorism and Assistant Professor in International Relations at the University of Nottingham - has extensively studied the period of upheaval in Congo.
His granduncle, James Burke, from Paul Street, Cork, was the Irish army's senior medical officer who treated the wounded (on both sides) following the Battle of Niemba, which occurred in the Congo on November 8, 1960. Nine Irish troops were 'murdered' during and after the battle. They were attacked by local tribesmen known as the Balubas.
Prior to that many Irish parents used to frighten their offspring for indiscretions by saying “the bogeyman would get them” if they were up to no good. They quickly replaced that with the 'Balubas', as it was more real and more frightening.
Dr Burke has stated that the Irish Defence Forces were “placed in a precarious political situation in the Congo” and were unfortunately seen as upholding the colonial economic interests of Belgium.