No shoot-to-kill policy on Bloody Sunday, Inquiry told

Britain’s most senior frontline officer on Bloody Sunday today denied that 13 unarmed civilians were killed because the British army was trying to make his suggestion to shoot rioters into a reality.

In his written statement to the Bloody Sunday inquiry General Robert Ford, 78, the Commander of Land Forces, also said there were “no plans to provoke a confrontation with the IRA” or to give Bogsiders “a rough handling” to teach them who was in charge.

Suspicions that Ford condoned a shoot-to-kill policy arise from a secret memo he wrote to his superior in Ulster, Lieutenant General Harry Tuzo, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) on January 7, 1972 – three weeks before Bloody Sunday.

Ford, who was responsible for the British army’s day-to-day operations in Northern Ireland, suggested the best way to help maintain law and order was to “shoot selected ringleaders” among the Bogside’s stone-throwing rioters - dubbed the Derry Young Hooligans (DYH).

Soldiers should use rifles adapted to fire .22 ammunition after “clear warnings have been issued“.

Today he denied that his recommendation, which was outside the British army’s rules of engagement, amounted to a shoot-to-kill policy saying: “The suggestion to shoot a few leaders was not an instruction to kill – ’shoot’ and ’kill’ are obviously different words.”

Ford rejected as “ridiculous” claims that Bloody Sunday was his January 7 memo brought to life. The plan never received an official go-ahead, he said.

In his inquiry statement Ford said: “It is certainly not the case, if it be suggested, that the march of 30 January was used, or was intended to be used, as an opportunity to put into effect the discussion points I had put to the GOC in my memorandum of 7 January 1972.”

The British paras were not given a licence to kill but had the go-ahead for an aggressive military offensive to stop an illegal march with up to 400 arrests. The 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment was deployed to arrest rioters, but came under fire from the IRA, he said.

Due to his age and ill health Ford’s live testimony to the inquiry, currently sitting in London, will be heard only in the mornings and over several weeks.

He maintains he attended the march purely as an observer and played no part in giving orders.

Tactical decisions on that day were solely the responsibility of Brigadier Patrick MacLellan, Commander of 8th Brigade, who was in charge of all the paras in Derry, said Ford.

In his statement he said: “The operation order issued to all troops taking part and giving them their tasks was issued by him and in his name. There can only be one commander for any operation. I was present only as an observer.”

Ford maintains he did not pressure Brigadier MacLellan to go in hard and that his presence on the ground was “neither unusual nor sinister“.

Statements Ford made in a 1984 book interview appear to contradict his current stance, the inquiry was told.

In the interview it is recalled he relayed the message that it was time “to get a move on and send in the paras!” despite Brigadier MacLellan’s protests that this must not happen because “the rioters and the marchers had not yet separated“.

Ford describes these comments as “mistaken” and says he now struggles to remember the interview.

Bereaved families insist his frontline presence was pivotal to the way events unfolded and was part of the British army’s fundamental change in policy in Derry. They also argue that he had contempt for Derry’s resident battalions for allowing no-go areas in the Creggan and the Bogside to operate.

It was a time of deepening British army frustration over the IRA’s control of nationalist no-go areas which left Brigadier MacLellan “unhappy and somewhat despondent“.

The RUC Chief Superintendent Frank Lagan, a Derry Catholic, was “depressed and pessimistic” and the GOC had no confidence in him, according to Ford’s statement.

Ford dismissed claims in an Irish Government dossier that the march had been used to teach the Bogside community a lesson as “nonsense“, pointing to the strong media presence there.

The British army were keen to court the press after television cameras caught paratroopers beating marchers at the Magilligan anti-internment rally the previous week sparked damning criticism about military tactics.

The Irish Government dossier proved influential in persuading Tony Blair to set up the present inquiry into one of the grimmest milestones in the Northern Ireland Troubles. It helped blight chances for peace for nearly 30 years.