Managing retention and exit of personnel is key to resolving Defence Forces staffing issue 

Private industry swoops in to hire highly-trained members of the Defence Forces. So the taxpayer is paying for that training while industry captures the return, writes Tony Geraghty

While increased recruitment has eased the Defence Forces staffing crisis, the OECD has long argued that effective workforce planning depends less on hiring and more on predicting the exit of staff members. Stock picture

In my naval career, around the third year of training, I was undertaking a course at Britannia Royal Naval College in Dartmouth. One evening over dinner, the conversation turned to how long British navy officers were permitted to stay in the service. 

My colleagues spoke matter-of-factly about three broad options they were offered — short career, medium-term careers, and full careers. 

For someone at the beginning of their career, it sounded as if people were being written off before they had even begun. I later realised this was my first exposure to retention by design in practice.

By knowing who was leaving, and when, the British navy could plan discharges, focus expensive training on those it intended to keep, and reduce the training burden on those whose contribution would be shorter. What looked like targeted discharge was, in fact, targeted retention. 

That lesson resonates strongly in Ireland today.

Defence Forces are under-strength 

The OECD has long argued that effective workforce planning depends less on hiring and more on predicting exits. For the Defence Forces, this is not an abstract observation. 

Recruitment has improved in recent years, and 2025 saw some of the highest intake in a decade. 

Yet overall strength remains significantly below the desired number, and net losses continue as experienced personnel leave faster than they can be replaced. Direct entry and rejoining mechanisms exist, but they are useful only as marginal tools, yielding little real return — even during the covid pandemic.

The Defence Forces face a structural disadvantage: You cannot hire trained military personnel in the market, yet those who leave are immediately employable elsewhere. 

Industry demand for Defence Forces staff 

Highly trained engineers, cyber specialists, air traffic controllers and technicians — the list goes on — are in demand. If exits are unplanned, the organisation risks training too many people expensively who will not stay, and too few to the highest level who are critical for delivering military effects and capability.

Training cycles illustrate the challenge. Some trainees reach operational readiness in six to 12 months. Others — aircrew, marine engineers, cyber specialists, and senior weapons technicians — require three to six-plus years of education, mentoring, and experience. 

These are the roles most coveted by industry. Each departure represents not only lost capability, but also a sunk investment in time and expertise.

Industry understands this well. 

Pharma and med-tech sectors 

For example, in Ireland’s pharmaceutical and medical-technology sectors, training a technician from scratch can take three to four years, combining salary, formal education and supervision. 

If buying out a trained Defence Forces technician were not cheaper than training one from scratch, industry would not do it. Yet buy-outs occur, with companies covering the costs individuals would otherwise repay under service commitments — a buyout clause.

As acknowledged in parliamentary discussions, industry is willing to absorb these costs. It is arguable that the taxpayer is being mugged by the market: The State pays for training; industry captures the return.

The loss of highly trained personnel can have direct operational consequences. Military capability rests on equipment and people; without retention, equipment is inert. 

Defence Forces unable to operate

Ships remain alongside due to uncrewed positions, aircraft remain grounded without air traffic controllers, cyber systems sit unmonitored and weapon systems are not maintained — the list goes on. A lack of trained personnel equates to a lack of capability, which in turn undermines strategic deterrence — including during Ireland’s EU presidency, where the ability to act credibly and robustly matters.

Britain’s experience illustrates the stakes. It faces similar maritime, air and cyber challenges. Retention failures in aviation and engineering did not merely affect morale; they constrained operational output.

The British military response has been to introduce targeted pay and retention bonuses for scarce skills, recognising that capability can only be sustained if trained personnel remain. Ireland faces a comparable imperative.

Managing retention is the key 

So what is to be done? 

The answer is not to try to retain everyone, nor to chase ever-higher recruitment targets in the hope that numbers will stick. 

Retention must be deliberate.

Structural reform begins with cohort differentiation. Not everyone requires or seeks a full career, and that is no bad thing. But those on long, specialist pipelines must be identified early and supported accordingly. 

This is largely cost-neutral and prevents wasted training investment. Planned exits should follow. When exits are known and predictable, the Defence Forces can train, transition, and adapt without hollowing out capability.

Retention-weighted pay comes next. Where remuneration is used, it should be targeted at scarce skills rather than applied broadly. Industry pays for scarcity; defence must be able to do the same at predetermined decision points. 

Professional identity also matters. People stay where their expertise is recognised. Strong accreditation, clearer specialist pathways, and visible esteem for technical mastery are powerful, low-cost retention tools.

Direct pathway to First Line Reserve

Other initiatives merit consideration. 

A formal pathway for former Defence Forces non-commissioned officers to join the First Line Reserve does not currently exist, despite previous recommendations. This is the norm in most European countries. It preserves skills already paid for while providing capability insurance.

Reform of buyout clauses

Reform of existing buyout clauses may also be necessary. They are increasingly misaligned with market reality, though any adjustment must avoid perceptions of unfairness while addressing market distortion.

Emergency retention initiatives 

Finally, emergency retention initiatives for core skills should be considered to ensure critical capability is maintained during periods of high attrition and geopolitical instability.

Retention is not a technicality. It is the backbone of operational capability. Without it, Ireland cannot rely on the Defence Forces to respond credibly and robustly when sovereign rights are challenged.

Recruitment fills the ranks; retention sustains the force delivering capability and providing a deterrent. Ireland’s defence depends on understanding the difference.

• Tony Geraghty was a commander in the Irish Naval Service until his retirement in 2025