West must help rebels create a state

IN BENGHAZI a few weeks ago, I talked to a friend who has lived her entire life in Libya and whose father had, until the uprising began, been very closely linked to Muammar Gaddafi.

What had struck her as the finest development since the uprising started? I expected her to talk about newfound freedoms, about the ability to truly speak her mind for the first time. Instead she replied: “Not having to hear Gaddafi’s speeches every day.”

It was a telling detail. While the rebellion swirled around her, she focused on a seemingly minor aspect of life under Gaddafi that she had come to find intolerable: the fact that the Leader — also known as the Guide, and King of Kings — was someone whose mere voice was asphyxiating.

In the end, in ways we do not yet completely understand, the final days of Gaddafi’s regime came swiftly at the hands of rebels in western Libya.

Undoubtedly, the steady degrading of the regime’s resources since the Nato-led campaign began in March contributed to the denouement. So did the fact that the western rebels had become better organised and had closed ranks in the weeks before the assault on Tripoli. Added to that were ample military supplies contributed by France and Qatar, along with Nato intelligence.

Tripoli was now in the hands of the rebellion. It was the kind of sudden regime collapse many observers had feared. For while there was great relief that the civil war was ending, there was also an understanding that for the National Transitional Council (NTC) — the rebel government in Benghazi — the real test was about to start.

Can Libya’s new leaders translate their military victory into winning the larger battle ahead — building a country whose political, social, and economic principles will be antithetical to those that have guided Libya for 42 years? In answering that question, we can allow ourselves some cautious optimism.

There are two daunting challenges. The first is state building: The creation and maintenance of the most basic civic institutions.

In Libya, Gaddafi aborted this in the quixotic pursuit of statelessness (jamahiriya) — the notion political communities can rule themselves without the intervention of state institutions. Libya under Gaddafi was a lopsided system where the state specialised in doling out oil revenue to the population, but had virtually no functions beyond this distributive task (other than oppression).

The second challenge will be to turn Libya into a unified nation for the first time since its independence in 1951. Beyond building institutions, Libya’s leaders must ensure this state attracts the allegiance of all Libyans while providing incentives to prevent groups from defecting. This requires the creation of a unified civic identity.

To its credit, the NTC took firm steps toward state building, planning in earnest for a post-Gaddafi Libya that would rely on transparent institutions. It drew up a stabilisation plan with the help of its 70-person delegation in Dubai. It also outlined versions of a constitution that were discussed in detail during its meetings, and in consultation with outside partners.

They planned as well for the immediate and long-term stabilisation of Libya, and for public order — a daunting challenge, given that thousands of weapons have been looted from the arsenals. The council also drew up plans for elections, and for dealing with the incendiary issues of retribution and justice.

All of this is encouraging. The plans go far beyond the hackneyed slogans that informed whatever planning efforts were ever undertaken by Gaddafi. There is a clear-eyed quality to the NTC’s aspirations that merits admiration: The recognition of the council as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people at the Contact Group meeting in Istanbul in July came as an appropriate gesture by the two dozen countries within the group that have supported the rebel cause.

But while the council must be applauded for its organisational and diplomatic prowess, there is much to worry about. Last month, in the aftermath of the killing of Abdel Fattah Younes, the rebels’ military commander, fault lines emerged that showed how fragile the consensus is within the NTC. At a press conference, Mustafa Abdel Jalil claimed the killing had been the work of Gaddafi loyalists. It was actually at the hands of one of the 40 rebel militias in Benghazi alone. Strikingly, Jalil was surrounded by members of the Obeidy tribe to which Younes belonged — no NTC members were present for fear of retaliation.

The greatest post-Gaddafi problem may be an embarrassment of riches as a rush of aid, unfrozen assets, and investors descends upon a country whose regulatory capabilities are weak and whose leadership will be challenged once euphoria ebbs. The groundwork the NTC laid during the civil war will prove helpful, but it may not be enough. And as always in Libya’s modern history, oil will be key.

Under Gaddafi, oil was the big spoiler, spawning a patronage system that perpetuated his dictatorship for 42 years. Turning oil into a positive force will require an extraordinary effort from those in power to eschew the easy option of just spending revenues to achieve political outcomes.

These are difficult qualities to expect from the NTC. In part because of the collegial-style management the NTC pursued during the war, Libya lacks a charismatic leader who can rise above the fray. The danger is that the new government will succeed in creating aspects of a new state, but will have trouble convincing Libyans that this state represents a national consensus. The West should be cautious about what to expect. But it should provide all the help Libya needs.