State Papers 1986: Row simmered between British and Irish governments over Sellafield tests
Documents released under the 30-year State rule show the minister for foreign affairs, Peter Barry, had inquired about the possibility of the two governments co-ordinating their monitoring activity in relation to tests carried out in the Republic and Northern Ireland on emissions from Sellafield.
However, the Northern Ireland secretary, Tom King, said it would be difficult for the Irish government to criticise its British counterpart on the basis of information obtained from such co-operation.
“It might be better to keep our operations as separate as possible,” said Mr King. “If we work together it might inhibit your opportunities to make representations against us or to the UK government.”
He added: “It might become an ambassador’s nightmare.” Mr Barry said there was also the issue about pollution into the Irish Sea but he agreed that co-operation might not be desirable on the issue.
At a meeting of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference in London on May 9, 1986, Mr Barry wondered if Sellafield might be shut down given the Cumbria nuclear plant had become the focus of much attention in the wake of the nuclear accident at Chernobyl a month earlier.
Michael Lillis, a senior civil servant in the Department of Foreign Affairs quipped: “It might in due course be melted down.”
However, Mr King said the British government was spending £3.6 billion to make Sellafield the safest plant in the world, although he acknowledged there had been some difficulties over the previous years.
“It was started at a time when the standards of control on emissions were not what they are now,” said Mr King.
He added: “We will spend £1m every day for the next ten years on the plant.” “There has been a massive concentration of investment to ensure safety of processing. There is a totally different situation at the site in Russia.”
Other records show that the Irish government had become concerned about a growing number of incidents at the Sellafield plant which included the discharge of radioactive material into the Irish Sea.
It had also emerged data about emissions from the nuclear facility from the 1950s had been substantially inaccurate.
Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald said such events had raised doubts about the operation and management of Sellafield.
Dr FitzGerald held the view that the monitoring of the plant should best be carried out at EEC level.
It followed a letter from Margaret Thatcher on March 6, 1986, in which she urged the Taoiseach to keep recent incidents in Sellafield in perspective as discharges into the sea and air had been progressively reducing at the plant.
“It is important not to let these relatively minor incidents, whose importance has been exaggerated in the media out of all proportion to the real risks to health and safety in an apparent effort to discredit the nuclear industry, overshadow the fact that BNF (British Nuclear Fuels) has substantially reduced its discharges in recent years at Sellafield,” Ms Thatcher wrote.
“The average amount of radiation received by the UK public from the nuclear industry is only about one-tenth of 1% of that from natural sources, and for the Irish public it is of course very much less,” said Ms Thatcher. In reply on March 24, 1986, Dr FitzGerald called for the discharge of nuclear waste into the Irish Sea to be minimised and totally eliminated as soon as possible.
He told the British prime minister that there was “a communications gap between the nuclear industry and the man in the street.”
Dr FitzGerald admitted that tests carried out by the Irish authorities on water and air quality found no significant radioactive pollution linked to Sellafield.
Records show civil servants decided that Ms Thatcher’s letter which provided a requested update about issues at Sellafield warranted a substantive reply.
“It appears desirable to put our position on the record. Otherwise the British may take it that our concern has been allayed and that we will not be pursuing the matter,” said Wally Kirwan, assistant secretary at the Department of the Taoiseach.
Mr Kirwan said in drafting a response for Ms Thatcher he was “conscious of the desirability, in the context of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, of not unnecessarily provoking the wrath of the Prime Minister.”
He claimed he had sought to “to strike a conciliatory tone”.



