THERE’S a silver lining to the dark clouds of populist Euroskepticism crowding in on the European Union. In Brussels, and in a number of Europe’s capitals, leaders know that the EU must respond to mounting discontent, and that, at long last, there is political capital in doing so.
The catalyst has been Britain’s nonsensical Brexit debate. The arguments of Leave campaigners are inaccurate, when they are not outright lies; but the furious debate in Britain over whether to remain in Europe has laid bare the EU’s deep-seated weaknesses, and has forced European leaders to heed them.
The rise of Europe’s populist parties is exerting similar pressure across the continent. And yet, though feared, those parties have scant political credibility; Britain’s Brexiteers, by contrast, include government ministers who count the EU’s supposedly undemocratic decision-making among its main shortcomings.
In fact, the EU’s chief failures have little to do with democracy. The chaos of the refugee and migrant crisis, Europe’s inadequate response to the Arab Spring of 2011, the Ukraine crisis three years later, and Russia’s assertiveness cannot be blamed on how the EU reaches decisions.
But those events have underscored its inability to react quickly and decisively. Worse still, they have highlighted its failure to head off trouble by agreeing on economic and security strategies.
Nonetheless, democracy is key to the EU’s future. For years, critics have pointed to Europe’s ‘democratic deficit.’ The Council of Ministers — which, together with the European Parliament, makes up the EU’s legislature — is as impenetrably secretive as that of North Korea; indeed, it operates behind closed doors, without any public record of who said what.
There have been modest moves to increase the European Parliament’s powers, but they have not been recognised sufficiently by the European public to quiet complaints. Mollifying voters’ antipathy to the EU will require substantial change, and that uncomfortable truth is beginning to dawn on Europe’s mainstream politicians.
EU governments’ main fear has been that a vote for Brexit, on Thursday, will unleash a stream of copycat referendums elsewhere. It would deal a devastating blow to the EU’s credibility, both in its member states and abroad.
But a British decision to remain would be almost as bad, if the EU institutions in Brussels simply heaved a sigh of relief and returned to business-as-usual, leaving dysfunctional structures untouched. In that case, the populists would use the bogeyman of the EU ‘super-state’ to gnaw away at mainstream parties’ grassroots support.
What democratic reform, then, might be envisaged? The last time this question was asked was in 2005, when French and Dutch referendums torpedoed the EU’s proposed Constitutional Treaty.
The EU was at its apogee at the time, lifted by the new euro and the ambitious ‘Big Bang’ eastward enlargement of 2004; so the chances of securing change today, when the EU is at its nadir of popularity, would seem unlikelier.
In fact, the opposite could be true. When the ‘European project’ was thriving, only a few visionaries saw the need for centralising more powers. It might look counter-intuitive, but Europe’s falling productivity and shrinking workforce signal even tougher times ahead, and strengthen the case for an EU that is more efficient, as well as more democratically responsive.
And that’s the trickiest question of all. How can the EU transform ramshackle decision-making mechanisms, which have been re-jigged and subject to makeshift additions for 40 years, into an efficient, working democracy?
Standing in the way is the prized sovereignty of 28 countries that have very different political cultures and a host of conflicting national and regional interests. There are no obvious models.
Political scientists have suggested scores of ideas, ranging from the re-introduction of double mandates (giving national MPs a seat in the European Parliament) to the creation of an EU Senate in a bicameral system. But the details of a more democratic EU, in which the Commission would be made truly accountable to the public, are less important than the political will to move forward.
Most of Europe’s national governments, whatever their political colour, have long-opposed a more streamlined and democratic EU. Now, though, they must choose between being outflanked by Euroskeptic parties on both the far left and far right, or responding to that threat by creating a supra-national democracy that can satisfy voters’ legitimate concerns.
The 2003 European Convention that produced the ill-fated EU Constitution offers no blueprint for the future. Its convoluted business was conducted largely out of sight.
To stem mounting criticism of Europe, the EU needs the coup de théâtre of an open debate involving civil society, not just a handful of political representatives. Its premise must be that the EU is heading toward dissolution, and that only by becoming more responsive to Europe’s citizens can it reverse the trend.