Abbas may lose Gaza in attempt to clean up Palestinian politics
An academic by profession, Abbas has tried mightily to lead the Palestinian people with civility, adherence to democratic principles and disdain for violence.
Abbas introduced professional Western-style management to the presidency, but had no idea how to deal with grass-roots militants.
Firstly, in his attempt to counter his predecessor Yasser Arafat’s political corruption and micromanagement, Abbas lost whatever chance he had to retain the loyalty of the Fatah leadership, newly-appointed PA officials, security personnel, and, most importantly, local militants.
Then, calling for national elections, while politically correct, was political suicide because he lacked any idea of the possible outcome and did very little to ensure the discipline of Fatah.
An attempt at a primary to choose Fatah candidates backfired, owing to fraud and the losers’ refusal to honour the results. Rival Fatah candidates then split the party’s vote, allowing Hamas an easy victory.
Negotiations with the Israelis was one area where Abbas, who led the Oslo process, thought he could do well. But, unlike Oslo, when Abbas was working under Arafat and able to project power from that base, as Palestinian president he was both negotiator and the supposed power centre.
The Israelis discerned Abbas’s weakness early on, and once Hamas was elected in a landslide, had little incentive to help him, despite US prodding.
Not only was Abbas politically weak, he also didn’t show much interest in Gaza — spending as little time as he could there, preferring his Ramallah office on the West Bank and spending time with visiting politicians and meeting world leaders.
While Abbas was technically the commander-in-chief of the Palestinian forces, these forces lacked the will to stand up to Hamas’s growing power.
The economic siege on Palestine after the Hamas victory further weakened him.
With no salaries to pay teachers (or the security services), his ability to influence even his own presidential guard was limited.
During a meeting, which I attended, with press delegates to obtain the release of the BBC journalist Alan Johnston — abducted in Gaza in March —Abbas explained the PA’s inability and weakness. Soldiers march on their stomachs, he said, and complained that his own forces have not been able to renew their equipment or obtain ammunition for seven years.
Ironically, the Israelis and the international community, which had frozen Palestinian finances, wanted Abbas to continue to control the security forces, despite Fatah’s loss in the parliamentary elections. Israel and the US led a virtual blockade on Palestine, with Israel refusing to return collected taxes and the US pressing world banks not to recognise the signature of the Palestinian finance minister. The nominal reason is Hamas’s refusal to recognise Israel. But most Arab countries don’t and yet the banking world deals with them normally.
A compromise power-sharing agreement brokered by the Saudis initially seemed to be a solution. According to the Mecca agreement signed last February, Hamas would give up important ministries such as finance, interior, and foreign affairs, while Abbas would ensure the end of the economic siege.
Four months later, however, the siege has not been lifted, and the Hamas ministers who were forced out now feel betrayed and are demanding their jobs back.
If the Israelis and the international community want Abbas to remain in power, they must lift the economic siege and provide him with military and political support. And, if the Israelis are convinced that Abbas is too weak, they can help the Palestinians by releasing the Fatah strongman, Marwan Barghouti, from an Israeli jail.
Otherwise, Abbas will be left with no alternative but to follow the advice of a leading Palestinian professor, Ali Jirbawi, who suggested simply that Abbas should dissolve the Palestinian Authority and return power to the Israelis, who remain legally and practically responsible for the areas they occupied in 1967.
Daoud Kuttab is a Palestinian director of the Institute of Modern Media at Al Quds University in Ramallah. Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2007.
