Number 10 ‘wanted to strengthen dossier’

BRITISH intelligence agencies were issued with an 11th-hour appeal for more evidence to strengthen Downing Street’s dossier on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, it was disclosed yesterday.

And the Hutton inquiry was also told the intelligence agencies privately concluded that some Iraqi weapons could be deployed in as little as 20 minutes, rather than the more cautious 45-minute estimate in the dossier.

The inquiry into the death of weapons expert David Kelly was told the agencies were asked to come up with more evidence of Iraq's weapons programmes because Downing Street wanted the dossier to be "as strong as possible".

But John Scarlett, chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee responsible for drawing up the document, insisted there had been no interference from Number 10 in the intelligence judgments in the dossier.

The inquiry also heard evidence that Dr Kelly did not give his "specific consent" to be named publicly as the possible source of a BBC story claiming the dossier had been "sexed up" to strengthen the case for war.

The inquiry was set up to investigate how Dr Kelly apparently came to take his own life after being identified as the source of a BBC report claiming the dossier had been transformed in the week before publication at the behest of Downing Street.

The inquiry was shown an e-mail from the Cabinet Office staff responsible for drafting the dossier, on September 11 less than a fortnight before its publication appealing to the agencies for more information.

It noted: "I appreciate everyone, us included, has been around some of these buoys before. But Number 10, through the chairman, want the document to be as strong as possible within the bounds of the available intelligence. This is therefore a last (!) call for any items of intelligence that the agencies think can and should be included."

However Mr Scarlett told the inquiry the request was "simply part of the work in progress".

He stressed he document had simply been designed to show the intelligence assessment available to ministers, and was not intended to make the case for war. "In no sense, in my mind or in the mind of the JIC, was it a document designed to make a case for anything," he said.

Mr Scarlett insisted that the BBC report, by the Today programme journalist Andrew Gilligan had been "completely untrue".

The inquiry also heard how the JIC had actually hardened its internal assessment of the controversial 45-minute claim in the dossier.

The original JIC assessment dated September 5, shown to the inquiry, noted: "Iraq has probably dispersed its special weapons, including its CBW (chemical-biological warfare) weapons. Intelligence also indicates that from forward deployed storage sites, chemical and biological weapons could be with military units within 45 minutes."

However, an e-mail from the Defence Intelligence Staff the following day stated: "The intelligence reveals a maximum of 45 minutes. Average was 20 minutes. This could have important implications in the event of a conflict."

As a result the JIC assessment was revised on September 9 to state: "Intelligence also indicates that chemical and biological munitions could be with military units and ready for firing within 20 to 45 minutes."

Mr Scarlett acknowledged the information had come from a single source but said that it was "an established line of reporting and it was quoting a senior Iraqi military officer".

Although the claim that weapons could be fired within 20 minutes was not included in the published dossier, Mr Scarlett acknowledged the language relating to the 45-minute claim had hardened during the drafting process. Mr Scarlett acknowledged that Downing Street communications chief Alastair Campbell had asked if the language could be "tightened".

He insisted that Mr Campbell had never sought to interfere in the intelligence judgments in the dossier and flatly denied reports of rows between them over the drafting process. He insisted the decision to produce the dossier had the full support of the intelligence agency chiefs although he acknowledged there had been some concerns lower down the ranks.

"I was aware that, at working level and maybe higher, there were worries in the intelligence community about the precedent that would be set by a document of this kind and of ensuring that in no way did it impinge on operational security and the security of sources," he said.