No Iraq chemical weapons stockpile, finds report

CONTRADICTING the main argument for a war that has cost more than 1,000 American lives, the top US arms inspector reported yesterday that he found no evidence that Iraq produced any weapons of mass destruction after 1991.

He also concluded that Saddam Hussein’s weapons capability weakened during a dozen years of UN sanctions before the US invasion last year.

Contrary to pre-war statements by US President George W Bush and top administration officials, Saddam did not have chemical and biological stockpiles when the war began and his nuclear capabilities were deteriorating, not advancing, according to the report by Charles Duelfer, head of the Iraq Survey Group.

Mr Duelfer’s findings come less than four weeks before an election in which Bush’s handling of Iraq has become the central issue. Democratic candidate John Kerry has seized on comments this week by the former US administrator in Iraq, Paul Bremer, that the United States didn’t have enough troops in Iraq to prevent a breakdown in security after Saddam was toppled.

The inspector’s report could boost Mr Kerry’s contention that Mr Bush rushed to war based on faulty intelligence and that sanctions and UN weapons inspectors should have been given more time.

But Mr Duelfer also supports Mr Bush’s argument that Saddam remained a threat. Interviews with the toppled leader and other former Iraqi officials made clear to inspectors that Saddam had not lost his ambition to pursue weapons of mass destruction and hoped to revive his weapons program if UN sanctions were lifted, the report said.

“There was a risk, a real risk, that Saddam Hussein would pass weapons or materials or information to terrorist networks,” Mr Bush said in a campaign speech yesterday, defending the decision to invade. “In the world after September 11, that was a risk we could not afford to take.”

But a top Democrat in Congress, Senator Carl Levin of Michigan, said Mr Duelfer’s findings undercut the two main arguments for war: that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction and that he would share them with terrorists like al-Qaida.

“We did not go to war because Saddam had future intentions to obtain weapons of mass destruction,” he said.

Travelling in Africa, British Prime Minister Tony Blair said yesterday that the report shows that Saddam was “doing his best” to get around the United Nations’ sanctions. For months, Mr Blair has been trying to defend his justification for joining the US-led invasion of Iraq in the face of heavy criticism from some in his own party.

Mr Duelfer presented his findings in a report of more than 1,000 pages, and in appearances before Senate committees.

The report avoids direct comparisons with pre-war claims by the Bush administration on Iraq’s weapons systems.

But Mr Duelfer largely reinforces the conclusions of his predecessor, David Kay, who said in January, “We were almost all wrong” on Saddam’s weapons programs.

The White House did not endorse Mr Kay’s findings then, noting that Duelfer’s team was continuing to search for weapons.

Mr Duelfer found that Saddam, hoping to end UN sanctions, gradually began ending prohibited weapons programs starting in 1991. But as Iraq started receiving money through the UN oil-for-food program in the late 1990s, and as enforcement of the sanctions weakened, Saddam was able to take steps to rebuild his military, such as acquiring parts for missile systems.

However, the erosion of sanctions stopped after the September 11, 2001, attacks, Mr Duelfer found, preventing Saddam from pursuing weapons of mass destruction.

Mr Duelfer’s team found no written plans by Saddam’s regime to pursue banned weapons if UN sanctions were lifted. Instead, the inspectors based their findings that Saddam hoped to reconstitute his programs on interviews with Saddam after his capture, as well as talks with other top Iraqi officials.