Dark money is a threat to national security that Ireland can no longer afford to ignore
A rescuer evacuates a cat after a Russian drone hit an apartment house in Kharkiv, Ukraine, earlier this month. Billions of euro have been raised through Dublin’s bond markets for Russian suppliers of commodities required for Russia’s illegal war on Ukraine.Â
It’s almost 15 years since the Mahon and Moriarty tribunals made damning findings of political corruption in Ireland.Â
It’s more than a decade since Maurice McCabe’s revelations exposed systemic maladministration of the penalty points system.Â
Since then, a relatively small number of controversies and corruption-related prosecutions have illustrated the enduring potential for low standards in high places. Nonetheless, such cases have not dominated political or media discourse to the same extent as they did more than a decade ago.
The relative scarcity of headlines documenting dodgy dealing — in contrast to those from our nearest neighbour — are reflected in international perceptions of corruption here. Ireland features among those countries perceived to be least affected by political corruption, and sits above the UK in the latest Corruption Perceptions Index (for the third year running). That should be little coincidence, given the steady feed of stories from Britain over fast-lane PPE contracts, a general election betting scandal, as well as cash for peerages and political influence.
This might be a source of some schadenfreude here, but it’s no cause for complacency. The risk of corruption is no less immediate and no less grave than when the tribunals were at work. Indeed, it is partly because corruption is less visible and less frequently reported upon that it poses such a serious threat — not least to Ireland’s national security.
Although there has been much debate about military neutrality and increased defence spending, Ireland still has no overarching national security strategy. While the State does have sectoral strategies — including a national cyber security strategy and the imminent publication of an economic crime and anti-corruption strategy — it still lacks a fully integrated, whole-of-government framework addressing hybrid threats to critical infrastructure and our political system.
Ireland is unlikely to face a conventional military invasion in the foreseeable future. Its geographical position and relative scarcity of natural resources have long served as disincentives for many would-be invaders.Â
That does not make the State invulnerable to other forms of attack, however.
Although a Garda investigation last year cleared an Oireachtas member, with the apparent code-name ‘Cobalt’, of engaging with Russian intelligence, reports highlighted attempts to recruit Irish officials in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. They also suggested that its security services consider Dublin to be a permissive environment from which to co-ordinate active measures on our EU neighbours and the UK.
Foreign intelligence agencies are not the only actors that consider Ireland a permissive environment for illicit activity. The State’s economic model has created a globally significant financial services sector.
With more than €10 trillion in investment fund assets administered in Ireland, Dublin has become the second-largest hub for investment fund administration in the EU. International observers, including the IMF, have noted that the scale of activity is not matched by the capacity of financial intelligence and law enforcement authorities to police them.
Ireland’s company formation regime and light-touch regulation of corporate vehicles — including limited partnerships — continue to present opportunities for hostile state actors and organised crime groups, either seeking to raise capital to sustain military operations or launder illicit funds through shell companies and tax-friendly investment vehicles.
Billions of euro have been raised through Dublin’s bond markets for Russian suppliers of commodities required for Vladimir Putin’s illegal war on Ukraine. A search by TI Ireland of the Register of Beneficial Ownership (RBO) in 2022 suggested that the beneficial owners of these assets had not been disclosed on the register, as required by law.
Despite a revised EU anti-money-laundering directive coming into force which compels member states to share details on the ownership of companies registered in their jurisdictions with journalists and civil society organisations, the Irish Government has yet to do so. The deadline for transposition of this provision in the directive is July this year.Â
Tellingly, the Government shut down public access to the RBO almost immediately after an EU court ruling on privacy rights in 2022, but it has not acted with the same alacrity when EU law was changed to account for the same judgement in 2024.
Indeed, a report published by TI in 2025 showed that Ireland’s corporate regime was one of the most secretive in the EU. Along with Hungary, Ireland refuses to share corporate ownership information with anyone other than public authorities. The secrecy surrounding company ownership, investment vehicles, and trusts, along with our low corporate tax regime, combined with its strong reputation for rule of law, make Ireland an attractive location for the proceeds of organised crime, corruption, and foreign intelligence ‘slush funds’.
The threats do not come solely from the EU’s traditional enemies, either. In addition to its threats to invade Greenland, the Trump administration’s new national security strategy signalled its support for efforts to undermine liberal democracy in the EU. More recently, the US state department announced that it will create a fund for far-right ‘think-tanks’ and political groups in Europe.
This should focus the minds of EU governments — not only on countering the politics of hate, but also on rebuilding public trust in liberal democracy and reversing the erosion of democratic norms upon which the European project has been built. The least they can do, therefore, is to strengthen transparency and accountability in politics and political finance, in particular. This, for better or for worse, remains the responsibility of national governments, too many of which are wilfully blind to the risks to democracy posed by the near limitless flow of funds to lobbyists, politicians, and political parties.
To its credit, Ireland has relatively strong statutory limits on political donations, but it has limited capacity to monitor them. There are still significant loopholes that would allow anyone to circumvent the rules or exert illicit influence over public policy. For example, donors could still provide multiple sub-threshold donations across different candidates without disclosure, if each individual contribution falls below reporting thresholds.
Despite the Mahon Tribunal’s findings on the misuse of consultancy or lobbying payments as a cover for bribery, Ireland still does not require lobbyists to disclose the sources of their funding. Office holders and legislators are also still free to receive loans and guarantees without any need to disclose them — despite a Government promise 15 years ago to reform our ethics laws and address a risk highlighted by both the Mahon and Moriarty tribunals.
Governments in Ireland and across the European Union must recognise that the absence of daily reports on corruption does not mean that they are doing enough to address the risk of corruption.
If we are to protect our economy, democratic institutions, and citizens’ constitutional rights, then Ireland’s political leaders, in particular, must move beyond rhetoric and implement a holistic national security strategy — a strategy that recognises the threats posed by dark money to democracy and that places political integrity, transparency, and accountability at the heart of it.
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