The EU is preparing for war – is Ireland?

With a marine territory 10 times our landmass, and which includes much of the northern hemisphere’s critical subsea cables, Ireland's defence capabilities should be built around maritime capacity, writes Edward Burke

Tue, 07 Oct, 2025 - 01:17

Edward Burke

In recent weeks the defence community — including military leaders and civilian analysts — in the United States has had to endure lectures from the Trump administration on why it was necessary to rename the Department of Defense to the Department of War.

According to War Secretary Pete Hegseth, the use of the term ‘defence’ was too passive or even pacifist, when what needed was a military prepared to go out and wage war in the world so Americans could have peace at home. Hegseth has been rightly mocked for his posturing.

Any analysis which claims that the US has been too timid during its ‘War on Terror’ is alarming. But Hegseth is evidently not a man moved by facts.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, Ireland also grapples with nomenclature when it comes to the military. The term ‘war-fighting readiness’ is almost unheard of when it comes to discussions about the Irish Defence Forces. But even the word ‘defence’ can also prove controversial.

An elderly woman walks past a house destroyed by a Russian strike in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine on Sunday. Our European partners are focused on how to deter and, if required, defend against a Russian invasion of an EU member state. Photo: AP/Kateryna Klochko

There have been debates within government departments about whether the term should be used in the context of ministers outlining Ireland’s commitment to the European Union or whether ‘security’ is a description less likely to perturb a public that predominantly, or even exclusively, views the Irish military through a peacekeeping lens.

While we in Ireland debate the use of ‘defence’ versus ‘security’ or whether to exchange a ‘triple lock’ for a ‘double lock’ authorising overseas military deployments, our European partners are focused on how to deter and, if required, defend against a Russian invasion of an EU member state.

Last week, European heads of state and government gathered in Copenhagen for a summit on defence hosted by the Danish presidency of the EU.

Denmark’s prime minister Mette Frederiksen warned that Russia was deliberately targeting the EU, testing its defences through drone incursions and sabotage, while also undermining Europe’s democracies through its support for extremists. This was, she said, the most dangerous moment in Europe since the Second World War — what is required is "a very strong answer back".

The path to providing that strong answer was set out in an EU ‘scoping paper’ discussed in Copenhagen. This listed priority capability areas for EU member states to counter the threat from Russia, including air and missile defence, strategic enablers (such as air-to-air refuelling, command and control, strategic reconnaissance and intelligence), military mobility (especially transport aircraft), artillery systems, cyber, AI, electronic warfare systems, missiles, drones, ground combat and maritime defence resources.

Taoiseach Micheál Martin welcomed the paper and discussed the need for Ireland to further improve “defence capabilities at home,  particularly in the areas of cyber defence and maritime security”.

Ireland's military

The Taoiseach’s ambitions are welcome but the current review of member states’ capabilities in each of these areas, overseen by the chairman of the EU Military Committee, former chief of staff of the Defence Forces, General Seán Clancy, will make for uncomfortable reading in advance of Ireland’s own EU presidency next year.

The government has promised increased investment in the Defence Forces – €1.7 billion has been allocated to defence in the National Development Plan from 2026 - 2030 – but this still falls way short of the investment committed by similarly sized EU member states. It is also likely that the government will miss its own 2028 deadline of achieving all the capabilities outlined in Level Of Ambition 2 of the report produced by the Commission on the Defence Forces, due to procurement, recruitment and training challenges.

For an island state with a marine territory of 880,000km2, 10 times its land area, and which includes much of the northern hemisphere’s critical subsea cables, Ireland’s defence posture should be built around maritime capabilities. In addition to a well-equipped naval service, maritime air and marine commando units should have been prioritised decades ago.

Norway organised and equipped its military based on geography and foreseeable threats, while also contributing to UN peacekeeping missions. Ireland did not. That oversight cannot be undone quickly.

Encouragement

There have been encouraging signs in recent years that the government is moving to address vulnerabilities in the maritime domain. Ireland is a participant in the Common Intelligence Sharing Environment initiative, which will expedite the sharing of maritime intelligence.

The government has also joined the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation project on critical seabed infrastructure protection. However, this project — led by Italy — will not be completed for at least another 10 years.

Ireland cannot wait that long. The recent activities of Russian military vessels in Ireland’s maritime economic exclusion zone (EEZ), including spy ships suspected of gathering intelligence on critical subsea cables, must be addressed.

Short-term objectives

European partners do not expect a miraculous transformation whereby Ireland can suddenly unilaterally defend our air and maritime space and contribute to all EU priority areas set out in the scoping paper. But in the short-term the government can invest in detection capabilities whereby Ireland can sound the alarm in its EEZ and do more to counter cyber-attacks and industrial espionage by hostile states.

There are many European partners who will come to Ireland’s aid in the event of an attack on critical infrastructure – it is in their interests to do so since the risk of contagion in the event of a major cyber-attack or the wider effects of cutting subsea cables, vital for global communications, are obvious.

The UK has demonstrated that it is relatively straightforward to quickly acquire a vessel originally designed for scientific and construction purposes and refit it as a multi-rule ocean surveillance ship (with a significant number of civilian crew) to monitor and detect interference with subsea cables.

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Ireland will also have to decide if it wants to have its own civilian signals intelligence service, with all the legislation and resources required, to defend the state in the cyber domain. The National Cyber Security Centre could transition to that role, but it is not there yet.

Rather than talking up the procurement of fast-jet capabilities for the Air Corps – which will take many years to become operational – Ireland should opt for much cheaper, near-term solutions aimed at improving detection of hostile state interference and intelligence collection.

This, and the harnessing of Ireland’s impressive technology sector, will do much to protect European democracies under attack.