Defence Forces win key funding battle — but is it enough to win the war?

A sea change in public opinion is needed in the coming years if Irish defence is to become fit for purpose, writes Colonel Dorcha Lee (retd).

Secretary-General Jacqui McCrum, Minister for Defence and Minister for Foreign Affairs Simon Coveney, Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Seán Clancy and Commission Chair Aidan O’Driscoll attend the launch of the Commission on the Defence Forces report at the United Nations Training School, The Curragh, Co Kildare. Picture: Julien Behal Photography

The Commission on the Defence Forces' report is the most comprehensive document of its kind on Irish defence that has ever been produced. It presents a more detailed analysis of the threats to national security, than heretofore made public, but draws short of listing these threats in order of priority. 

The report is forthright — brutally honest, in fact — in listing the deficiencies in the capabilities of all four components of the Defence Forces: the army, air corps, naval service and the reserve.

How will the public react to this report and to a possible tripling of spending on defence? Public apathy to defence is a challenge to political leadership and indirectly has led to the present situation where the Defence Forces were allowed to be run down to its present level, through an avoidable retention-in-service crisis that is now almost eight years old. 

On a broader scale, the nation has not got the minimal defence capability by international standards to deter a potential enemy. The drop from 1.67% of GDP in defence spending to its present level of 0.27% took place over decades, accelerating with the disastrous 2012/13 re-organisation.

Early criticisms of the commission’s terms of reference and calls on social media to boycott the submissions process were fortunately ignored. Many points in these submissions found their way into the report. 

In the event, the commission made full use of its discretion to interpret its TORs, and by clever use of footnotes it was able to point the reader in the direction of relevant areas, beyond its remit.

The report shies away from linking capabilities directly to the deterrent principle, which is that military capabilities should be sufficient to make it too costly for an enemy to attack or invade. This deterrent principle applies across the board to all five ‘domains’: land, air, sea, space, and cyber.

While the report does recognise this, there are significant omissions. There are references to cavalry squadrons but no mention of MBT (Main Battle Tasks) — an essential part of a combat brigade.

While combat aircraft (interceptors) are mentioned for the air corps, there is no mention of warships capable of naval combat. I was bemused to see a reference to “defensible conventional warfighting capability”, implying that our naval service patrol vessels might have the platforms/ fire protection to do this. Without actual warships capable of naval combat, such as a frigate, corvette, or any ship capable of anti-submarine operations, the proposals do not meet the minimum threshold to constitute a minimum deterrent.

It is good that the report recommends that Ireland participate in collaborative partnership and research for the space domain. However, there is no real consideration on how we should cope with threats from near-Earth orbit, or from the cisLunar region. The report avoids discussing or recommending that, in the fifth domain, we should consider Ireland having a robust cyber offensive capability, as a serious deterrent.

The central recommendations are drawn together and put in context by three proposed 'Levels of Ambition (LOAs)' which are options for Government to consider. 

LOA 1 outlines the present situation in the Defence Forces, clearly demonstrating that it is not currently fit for purpose.

Since the commission is clearly not recommending LOA1, the question arises why list it? But then later it makes sense to understand that LOA1 is the springboard to LOA 2. 

This will require an increase of 50% in defence funding, but still means our capabilities are short in all domains to reach the minimum deterrent principle. 

Hence LOA 2 can only be, at best, considered as an interim step. It is only at LOA3, to be reached by 2040, that our defence capabilities will draw closer to the level of our European neighbours. This timetable seems long, but it is realistic, if we don’t have a war in the meantime.

However, I do think that having the reserve army wait eight years to reach a strength comparable to its present approved strength is ridiculous.

Beyond the commission’s remit, there is a need to review the role, functions, and organisation of the Department of Defence secretariat, to rekindle an informed debate on neutrality, and examine how best to tackle the information deficit in the average citizen’s appreciation of national security and defence. But all that is for another day.

In the meantime, we need a sea change in public opinion to support the Defence Forces at this time.

One appearance by the Russian Fleet off Skibbereen may not be enough.

Spending billions on defence, even over a long time frame, is necessary. However, as Independent TD Cathal Berry recently reminded us: “If you think the price of peace is high, it is nothing compared to the price of war."

Colonel Dorcha Lee (retd), defence analyst