Any hasty foreign-troop withdrawal from Afghanistan would lead to a fiasco similar to the Soviet retreat from the country in the 1980s and would result in chaos, says
Despite ongoing peace negotiations between the United States and the Taliban, the bloody conflict in Afghanistan continues to take a heavy toll on the country’s people.
A recent suicide bombing of a wedding in Kabul (perpetrated by the Khorasan branch of the Islamic State; IS-K) killed 63 people and injured 200. It is a stark reminder of Afghanistan’s poor security.
It also shows that the Taliban are not the only armed opposition fuelling the conflict.
A US-Taliban peace pact is therefore unlikely to bring any respite.
The US-Taliban negotiations in Doha — in which the Afghan government is not a participant — are comparable to two previous peace processes: the Paris talks that resulted in the January 1973 peace treaty between the US and North Vietnam; and the negotiations that led to the 1988 Geneva Accords, signed by the Afghan and Pakistani governments, with the Soviet Union and the US acting as guarantors.
These two agreements were designed to enable the US and the Soviet Union to exit with ‘honour’ from wars they could not win, by bringing about, respectively, the ‘Vietnamisation’ and ‘Afghanisation’ of those conflicts. Both agreements failed to achieve their objectives.
By 1975, Soviet-backed North Vietnamese forces had overrun South Vietnam, humiliating the US. And in 1992, the US-supported Afghan Islamic resistance forces, the mujahideen, brought about the collapse of the Soviet-installed communist regime in Kabul.
Whereas the North Vietnamese soon united their country and restored peace, Afghanistan has fared much worse.
The socially and politically divided mujahideen soon turned their guns on one another.
And Pakistan advanced its regional interests by nurturing the extremist Taliban, who, in 1996-98, conquered most of Afghanistan and subjected it to strict theocratic rule.
The Taliban, in turn, harboured al-Qaeda, which carried out the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the US. That prompted America, backed by its NATO and non-NATO allies, to intervene in Afghanistan the following month to destroy al-Qaeda and dislodge the Taliban regime.
The US-led forces quickly dispersed al-Qaeda’s leadership and ended Taliban rule, but failed to defeat either group decisively.
The Taliban and elements of al-Qaeda had staged a comeback within two years of the US intervention, and have tied down American and allied forces in a low-grade, but staggeringly costly, insurgency ever since.
Now, after nearly two decades of fighting, US president, Donald Trump, desperately wants to disentangle America from a seemingly unwinnable war, and preferably through a political settlement with the Taliban.
Trump’s special representative for Afghanistan reconciliation, the Afghan-American Zalmay Khalilzad, has been engaged, since September 2018, in shuttle diplomacy, in an eerie parallel of the unsuccessful efforts of then-US secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, to bring about peace in the Middle East, following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.
Khalilzad has just begun his ninth round of negotiations with Taliban representatives in Doha.
Separately, he has had numerous meetings with the Afghan government and non-governmental leaders, as well as with regional and international actors — but not with Iran, with which the US is locked in a cycle of deepening hostility.
He has focused on four interrelated objectives:
A timetable for the exit of all foreign troops in Afghanistan;
A commitment from the Taliban to prevent hostile acts being launched against the US from Afghan soil;
Direct negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government (the former regards the latter as ‘illegitimate’ and a ‘puppet’);
A ceasefire across Afghanistan.
But although Khalilzad may finally reach agreement with the Taliban on the first two aims, there is no guarantee that America’s partner in the peace talks will help to realise the remaining two.
The Afghan government’s weakness and internal divisions would give the Taliban the upper hand in any power-sharing arrangement, particularly after US and allied forces have left.
And it is very doubtful that the Taliban, whether in power or as a partner in power, would be able to control other armed opposition groups, most importantly IS-K, or be able enlist the support of a cross-section of Afghanistan’s diverse population.
The Taliban are ethnic Pashtuns, and hail from the Ghilzai tribe, to which Afghan president, Ashraf Ghani (and many around him) belongs. Neither the Ghilzais nor the rival Durrani tribe of former president Hamid Karzai are much-trusted by non-Pashtun ethnic groups, who (though themselves divided) collectively form the largest share of Afghanistan’s population. To complicate matters further, all Afghan ethnic groups have extensive cross-border ties with the country’s neighbours.
Meanwhile, IS-K has loyalty to no-one inside Afghanistan. The group became operational in 2015 and is said to have about 2,000 fighters (including some Taliban defectors), who are dedicated to creating disruption and chaos. They have been responsible for horrific attacks across Afghanistan, especially in Kabul and mostly on civilian
Any withdrawal of US and allied forces during Trump’s current term, whether phased or otherwise, must be based on conditions on the ground. Otherwise, the consequences will be disastrous.
Because of how the peace process and the situation in Afghanistan have evolved, a hasty foreign-troop withdrawal would lead to a fiasco similar to the Soviet retreat from the country in the 1980s and similar to the US one from Vietnam in the 1970s.
To avoid such a catastrophe, the US and its allies need to remain in Afghanistan for at least another decade. But Trump is in a hurry, and thinks that a strong CIA presence in the country will do what Western forces have been unable to achieve.
That will prove to be wishful-thinking.