Koreas plan the rocky road to peace

ON Feb 12, 2013, North Korea carried out its third nuclear test in the run­up to the inauguration of a new administration, led by me, in the South. Around that time, the Presidential Transition Committee adopted the “Trust­Building Process on the Korean Peninsula” as a key policy of the new administration, aimed at creating a fresh dynamic in inter­Korean relations.

Though the North’s nuclear test created pressure to revise the trust­building process, I made it clear I would stay the course. Indeed, the trust­building process was intended specifically to break the vicious cycle of provocation and reward.

The process was formulated to overcome limitations of both appeasement and hardline policies: While the former depended entirely on the North’s tenuous good faith, the latter implied only relentless pressure.

The process is intended to build sustainable peace on the Korean peninsula by making the North pay dearly for its aggressive acts while ensuring opportunities for change and assistance if it is willing to become a responsible member of the international community.

Since the launch of our administration, North Korea has escalated its military threats and bellicose rhetoric against the South.

Last April, the North took the extreme step of unilaterally barring South Korean workers from entering the Gaesong Industrial Complex, a symbol of inter­Korean exchanges and co-operation, and withdrawing all of its own workers. Following the shutdown of the Gaesong facility, some suggested that the North be offered incentives to improve inter­Korean relations. But, aware that such contacts with the North had produced many adverse effects in the past, I opted for an open and transparent proposal for dialogue.

I repeatedly emphasised to the North that trust can be built only by co-operating on small but meaningful projects and abiding by our promises. I have also explained to the international community the credibility and necessity of anchoring our policy in the trust­building process, securing support from many countries.

North Korea finally came to the dialogue in mid­July, and a month later agreed to normalise the operation of the Gaesong complex in a constructive manner. As follow­up measures, a secretariat for the facility’s joint management was established, and government officials from the two Koreas began daily meetings.

It was a small but significant step forward, considering that inter­Korean dialogue has been virtually non­existent over the past five years, and that tensions stoked by the North reached a peak in the early days of my administration.

But there is still a long way to go. The North remains lukewarm on holding a follow­up dialogue to discuss passage of workers, communication, and customs clearance, all of which are essential.

In addition, North Korea unilaterally cancelled the agreement for the reunion of separated families, which had been concluded after much difficulty, breaking the hearts of those who have long been eagerly awaiting it. North Korea then resumed its slander and threats against us.

For the past 10 months, we have sought to abide by international norms in implementing our North Korea policy, while taking into consideration public expectations. We will stick to these fundamental principles and set the following priorities for future North Korea policies.

For starters, we will establish a strong deterrent capability, because air-tight security constitutes the foundation of genuine peace. From there, we will strive to forge sustainable peace through dialogue, exchanges, and co-operation. The two Koreas must establish mutual trust by discussing matters with prudence and mutual respect, and by keeping promises on what has already been agreed. Only then can we pave the way to peace and unification, thereby improving the quality of life and happiness of all Koreans.

Second, Korea will also work to consolidate co-operation with the international community in this process. Unification is certainly a matter for the Korean people to decide, but it should be achieved in the context of a consensus among neighbouring countries, thereby ensuring unification benefits all parties in the region.

Third, we will endeavour to upgrade the trust­building process on the Korean peninsula. We will devise various measures to expand the scope of South­North dialogue and co-operation, while continuing with the efforts to realise reunions of separated families and to resolve the issue of prisoners of war and abductees who have been kept in the North.

Fourth, we will increase the transparency of our North Korea policies. Of course, considering the nature of inter­Korean relations, not all matters can be fully disclosed. But providing as much accurate information as possible is the best way to ensure firm popular support for these policies and their implementation.

Fifth, Korea will seek denuclearisation of the North as a means to pursue joint progress on the Korean peninsula and across north-east Asia.

Indeed, without the North’s denuclearisation, the trust­building process cannot gain momentum. North Korea has recently shown interest in establishing special economic­development zones.

But no country, including South Korea, would invest in North Korea if it persists in nuclear development. If the North truly cares for its people and the nation’s future, it must give up the unrealistic twin goals of nuclear and economic development. Instead, it must become a global partner by adhering to international norms and getting along with its neighbours.

With Iran’s nuclear programme now being addressed, the international community is turning its attention to North Korea. The North must take advantage. If it shows a firm commitment to denuclearisation and takes practical steps towards this end, we will take the lead in securing the international community’s support for active assistance in the North’s economic development.

Bringing North Korea in from the cold is central to our foreign policy. Thus, I have proposed the Eurasian Initiative, which envisions connecting the continent’s divided logistics networks and removing obstacles that hinder trade, thereby creating a viable single entity.

The Eurasian Initiative, which is linked with my plan for the North-East Asia Peace and Co-operation Initiative, can succeed only if the peninsula first dismantles its wall of distrust, for Korea is the gateway between Eurasia and the Pacific.

The project to build a world­peace park in the demilitarised zone that divides the peninsula could be a starting point. From there, neighbouring countries, together with the two Koreas, must build trust and promote co-operation throughout the region.

* Park Geun­hye is president of the Republic of Korea. Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2013