Brian Lenihan can’t be off-limits for discussion about the mess we’re in

MARY O’ROURKE was not happy with me and was not slow to tell me why.

I met her last Friday morning at the annual conference of members of ISME, at which she was speaking and I was chairing. She said she had cried the previous Wednesday while watching me on the Vincent Browne Show on TV3 outline the flaws in the performance of her nephew, the late Brian Lenihan, during his time as finance minister and as outlined in my new book How Ireland Really Went Bust. She accused me of attacking a man who is not alive to defend himself.

I disagreed politely, mindful of the fact that the woman must still be grieving. I pointed out that he’d had plenty of opportunities to discuss and defend his performance with me when he was alive. She countered that I hadn’t been “in the room” on the infamous night that the ruinous bank guaranteed was introduced. I didn’t point out to her that she hadn’t been there either. But I did say there has been a deliberate and concerted effort by those who were present to limit what has been revealed, allowing only a small amount of documents to be released under the Freedom of Information Act.

I also asked her to read the book, which I said I believed was fair in its portrayal and assessment of how Lenihan and his taoiseach, Brian Cowen, had performed on that night and subsequently. She said she had read it but said no more about that, other than to say that at least Cowen is alive to defend himself.

As it happens Cowen has been unavailable to do so and is unwilling, as his predecessor Bertie Ahern has been, to defend his record in public. It all seems too raw for Cowen; he may still be in shock, much as he appears to have been when he was in office and as everything came tumbling down around him.

O’Rourke is one of his fiercest critics. She was blunt about his shortcomings and failings in the recent two-part RTÉ documentary Crisis: Inside the Cowen Government (to which I contributed). It seems likely that Cowen would have been greatly irritated by her and many others (particularly Mary Hanafin) because of their contributions to that programme. Self-serving would be one way of describing them.

O’Rourke’s criticisms and viewing of the programme made me consider again whether I had been fair to Cowen and Lenihan in both my book and in my contributions to the documentary. In the latter I was dependent on the editing process of others, but the book, while involving the editing by others, remains very much my own responsibility. I stand by what I said in the documentary about Cowen because it sums up much of what is in the book: it is an appalling legacy to have been the taoiseach who oversaw the rushed introduction of the bank guarantee and to have surrendered economic sovereignty, as happened last November.

His performance prior to becoming taoiseach, during his time as finance minister, was appalling too. This is not hindsight: I wrote in April 2008, on his becoming leader of Fianna Fáil, that he had an enormous amount to do to justify the garlands being thrown his way and that his performance as finance minister had not been impressive.

I go into greater detail in the book, particularly about what others have told me about Cowen’s behaviour while in office. The obvious manifestation of the psychological pressure he suffered was his drinking of alcohol. There is little doubt but that Cowen did not exhibit sufficient care about his drinking while in office. It may have been his way of releasing pressure, but a middle-aged man with his responsibilities, excessive weight and previous health concerns (and the knowledge of the death of his father at the age of 51) should not have behaved as he did during a national crisis. He needed all his wits about him at all times, not to be dealing with hangovers.

But what about Lenihan’s performance? Lenihan should not and cannot be off-limits to legitimate examination of his record, but there is a danger that sympathy for his personal tragedy can lead to overly sympathetic examination of his record. His illness, once disclosed, could not be a private matter, not when he held a key position at one of the most important times in the history of the state.

The reality is that there were very serious concerns in both the Department of the Taoiseach and the Department of Finance in the early months of 2010. Lenihan was unavailable because of treatment on many days when he was needed.

Cowen never moved against him, partly because of loyalty (and they remained loyal to each other until near the end of Cowen’s leadership), partly because of a worry that the public might react negatively to the removal of a sick man as if it was callous rather than necessary, and partly because of the realisation Lenihan had the communication skills that Cowen himself lacked.

Lenihan got a pass in some respects because he was likeable and engaging. Journalists liked him because he would answer questions and be available to do so, unlike others. (You could argue that he played the media along, knowing that he would get it somewhat easier if he engaged with it.) Also he was not part of the government as a full minister until after the 2007 general election and did not get his first economic ministry until after Ahern’s 2008 departure. He was a lawyer who had to get up to speed quickly on economic and financial ministries, but he cannot evade responsibility for the guarantee, the establishment of the disastrous NAMA (to which he was central), the failed and recurring recapitalisations of the banks and the ultimate surrender to the EU and IMF. And much of what he said about the economy “turning the corner” was nonsense.

He was unlucky in many respects — not just with his health but with the impact of outside events. I remember him getting furious with me in early November last year as I pressed him on soaring yields on Irish bonds, suggesting this was the markets reacting to his policy of increased austerity, knowing it would not work. He blamed, and with some merit too, the uncertainty caused by comments made by Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy that raised the possibility that sovereign states would be allowed to default on debts from 2013, making it almost impossible for Ireland to raise new loans on international markets.

Lenihan and Cowen found that their reward for doing all of that had been asked of them by the European Commission and ECB was to be hung out last November when it was decided that Ireland should be sacrificed for the greater good of the euro area. Knowing that it would finish them politically Cowen and Lenihan found the takeover but ultimately had to surrender. To a degree it is possible to feel sorry for them, and the knowledge of his failure was difficult for Lenihan in his final months.

The RTÉ programme on Cowen’s crisis was great drama, and had fantastic photos and footage upon which to draw, and, within the time constraints, was fair. I would argue that the story is bigger than can be told in two hours of television, and of course I would. But I believe that, by and large, any unfairness is coming from the former political colleagues of those under the microscope.

The Last Word with Matt Cooper is broadcast on 100-102 Today FM, Monday to Friday, 4.30pm to 7pm.