Ireland's failure to protect subsea cable poses 'threat' to EU and Nato

Irish naval vessel LÉ Samuel Beckett. Because Ireland is not a member of Nato, hostile states, such as Russia, face “lower diplomatic risks” by interfering with cables in Irish waters, experts have said.

Ireland’s failure to protect critical subsea cables poses “a heightened level of threat” not just domestically but also for the EU and Nato, according to maritime experts.

They warn that because Ireland is not a member of Nato, hostile states, such as Russia, face “lower diplomatic risks” by interfering with cables in Irish waters, knowing it would still impact the western military alliance.

They also told the Irish Examiner that it was likely that the Government’s decision to cut from four to two the number of operational navy vessels will be exploited not only by criminal elements but potentially hostile states.

It is estimated that three-quarters of transatlantic cables  — the digital infrastructure for internet use and financial information — pass through or near Irish waters, with four cables physically connected to Ireland and 12 connecting Ireland and Britain.

A new paper by Robert McCabe of the Institute for Peace and Security at Coventry University, and Brendan Flynn of the school of political science at the University of Galway, said the apparent sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines in October 2022 “magnified the vulnerability” of critical maritime infrastructure.

It said Ireland’s energy was “heavily reliant” on subsea interconnectors, including between Ireland and Britain and Ireland and Iceland with one between Ireland and France due by 2027.

“The INS [Irish Naval Service] does not currently have the required subsurface capabilities or enough assets at sea at any one time to effectively undertake the broader maritime security responsibilities of the state," it said.

“The INS’s current vessels are austere and lack Nato standard sonars capable of detecting, classifying and tracking either submarines or submersibles.

“Apart from the physical and economic damage arising from a large-scale disruption, the reputational damage to Ireland as a ‘gateway to Europe’ would likely be profound with potential negative impact on foreign direct investment.” 

The academics said the updated white paper on Defence 2019 only mentions subsea cables once, while the National Cyber Security Strategy 2019-2024 does not mention them at all.

The paper, published in the European Security journal, said the fact subsea cables were not considered critical national infrastructure was a “significant gap”.

It called for the creation of a single agency within the Department of Defence or Transport to assume maritime security and said the new Maritime Area Regulatory Authority could be “repurposed” as such.

The authors concluded:

• There was “overly bureaucratic and siloed” governance with multiple public and private agencies;
• The underfunding of maritime security coupled with a Naval Service retention crisis meant there is “limited ability to know what is happening both on and beneath the ocean's surface”;
• The “muddled” governance meant coordinating a response in the event of a malicious act on a subsea cable or pipeline predominantly fell initially on the private sector.

“Because Ireland is not a Nato member means any, possibly Russian, intelligence or sabotage operation in the Irish EEZ [Exclusive Economic Zone] or even territorial waters has lower diplomatic risk,” it said. 

Given the war in Ukraine and the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, this scenario was “far from fanciful”.

It said it was a “plausible and lower risk strategy for raising the stakes with Nato countries by hitting them indirectly via critical infrastructure that passes through a non-Nato state”.

It concluded: “The result is a cumulative lack of credible subsea security capability whose implications are possibly stark not least for Ireland but also for the wider EU and Nato.” 

It said this provides "a heightened level of threat" well beyond Ireland's maritime borders.