Kay report - The main findings regarding WMD in Iraq

The search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq has so far drawn a blank.

Dr David Kay presented his interim report to US congressmen and women at private hearings, saying his team had not yet found stocks of weapons.

But, he said, his 1,200-strong CIA-led Iraq Survey Group (ISG) had “discovered dozens of WMD-related programme activities and significant amounts of equipment” that Iraq concealed from UN weapons inspectors.

Here are the main findings:

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

The ISG was “uncovering significant information” about biological warfare activities.

This included evidence about the development of organisms that could be used in biological warfare, and the involvement of Iraqi intelligence services in possible biological warfare activities.

Site visits and interviews with Iraqi Intelligence Service officials had led to the discovery of a network of laboratories and facilities within the security service.

The extent to which these were tied to biological terror weapons was not yet fully known, but “it was suitable for preserving biological weapons expertise” and capabilities.

Discussions with Iraqi scientists had uncovered the use of organisms as a cover for work with prohibited agents such as anthrax and ricin.

One scientist had confirmed that the production line for one organism “could be switched to produce anthrax in one week” if the seed stock were available.

Dr Kay’s report also referred to “a prison laboratory complex, possibly used in human testing of BW agents, that Iraqi officials working to prepare for UN inspections were explicitly ordered not to declare to the UN.”

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

THE ISG teams “have developed multiple sources that indicate that Iraq explored the possibility of chemical weapons production in recent years, possibly as late as 2003”.

An Iraqi senior military official told the ISG he had informed Saddam Hussein it would take six months to produce mustard gas.

Another senior Iraqi chemical weapons expert told the ISG he had estimated it would take two months to produce mustard (gas) and two years to produce sarin.

ISG leads were being followed on Iraq’s acquisition of equipment for a chemical weapons programme, including one involving a foreign company.

Evidence to date suggested Iraq’s large-scale capability to develop, produce and fill new chemical weapons munitions was reduced – if not entirely destroyed - during Operation Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of UN sanctions and inspections.

No evidence had yet been found to confirm “that Iraqi military units were prepared to use chemical weapons against coalition forces”.

Dr Kay said: “Our efforts to collect and exploit intelligence on Iraq’s chemical weapons programme has thus far yielded little reliable information on post-1991 chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons agent production.”

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Scientists had told the ISG that “Saddam Hussein remained firmly committed to acquiring nuclear weapons”.

One official believed that by 2000 Saddam had “run out of patience” with waiting for UN sanctions to end and wanted to resume a nuclear weapons programme.

However, documentary evidence of any resumption had not yet been found.

Evidence gathered from documents and scientists showed Iraq had worked to preserve some technical capability of its pre-1991 nuclear weapons programme.

Some of the key groups working on the nuclear programme remained largely intact post-1991.

DELIVERY SYSTEMS

The ISG had uncovered evidence that Iraq was committed to improving delivery systems for missiles.

These would have “dramatically breached UN restrictions placed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War”, namely the 150km range limit.

According to sources, Saddam had ordered the development of ballistic missiles with ranges of at least 400km and up to 1,000km.

Some sources said Saddam’s range requirements for missiles grew from 400-500km in 2000 to 600-1,000km in 2002.

Missile designers told the ISG Iraq had restarted work on converting SA2 surface-to-air missiles into ballistic missiles with a range of about 250km.

Design studies were also started on solid-propellant missiles with a range of more than 400km and up to 1,000km, sources said.

One source had suspected a new missile was to have a warhead filled with chemical weapons, but ISG investigations were continuing.

No evidence had yet been found to confirm reports that Iraq continued to produce liquid fuel and oxidiser specific to Scud-missiles until 2001.

Evidence was found of two cruise missile programmes. The first involved upgrading the range of Iraq’s HY-2 missiles from 100km to 150-180km, the second to convert the HY-2 into a 1,000km range land-attack missile.

The ISG had discovered documents showing dialogue between Iraq and North Korea from 1999, including a meeting in 2000 in Baghdad, and evidence of clandestine attempts between late-1999 and 2002 to obtain 1,300km ballistic missile technology from North Korea.

At the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom, these discussions had not led to any missiles being transferred to Iraq.

Material and testimonies had been obtained by the ISG on Iraq’s efforts to get parts and assistance from foreign countries for its missile programme.