Tony Blair allied with George Bush months before war

He relied on flawed intelligence and legal advice to go to war, a seven-year inquiry has concluded.
It criticised Blair on a range of issues, saying the threat posed by Iraqi dictator, Saddam Husseinâs supposed weapons of mass destruction had been over-hyped and the planning for the aftermath of the war had been inadequate.
Blair said that he had gone to war âin good faithâ, that he still believed it was better to remove Saddam, and that he did not see that action as the cause of terrorism today, in the Middle East or elsewhere.
The only Labour prime minister to win three general elections, Blair was in office for 10 years, until 2007, and was hugely popular in his heyday, but Iraq has tarnished his reputation and legacy.
The inquiry report, about three times the length of the Bible, stopped short of saying the war was illegal, which will disappoint Blairâs many critics.
âWe have, however, concluded that the circumstances in which it was decided that there was a legal basis for military action were far from satisfactory,â said John Chilcot, the inquiryâs chairman.

Blair said the report should exonerate him from accusations that he lied, which have been made by relatives of some of the 179 British soldiers who died in the conflict.
âThe report should lay to rest allegations of bad faith, lies, or deceit,â he said.
âWhether people agree or disagree with my decision to take military action against Saddam Hussein, I took it in good faith, and in what I believed to be the best interests of the country.â
But the soldiersâ relatives said they would study the report to examine if there was a legal case.
âWe reserve the right, ourselves, to call specific parties to answer for their actions in the courts, if such a process is found to be viable,â said Roger Bacon, whose son died in the war.
The report shed light on what happened between Blair and Bush in the months leading up to the March, 2003 invasion, an interaction that has long been the subject of speculation about secret deals and pledges.
In a memo dated July 28, 2002, eight months before the invasion, Blair told Bush: âI will be with you, whatever. But this is the moment to assess bluntly the difficulties.â
âThe planning on this, and the strategy, are the toughest yet. This is not Kosovo. This is not Afghanistan. It is not even the Gulf War.â
Chilcot said Blair had sought to influence Bush, offering Britainâs support while suggesting adjustments to the US position.
But Chilcot said that Blair had over-estimated his ability to influence the US. Chilcotâs report also said there was no imminent threat from Saddam in March, 2003, and that the subsequent chaos in Iraq should have been foreseen.
By 2009, 150,000 Iraqis, mostly civilians, had died, and more than a million had been displaced.

Britain joined the invasion without exhausting peaceful options and undermined the authority of the United Nations Security Council by doing so, the report said.
âIt is now clear that policy on Iraq was made on the basis of flawed intelligence and assessments. They were not challenged and they should have been,â Chilcot said.
He also said that the Blair governmentâs judgments about the threat posed by Iraqâs weapons of mass destruction were âpresented with unjustified certaintyâ.
No such weapons were discovered after the war.
Chilcot said Blair changed his case for war from focusing on Iraqâs alleged âvast stocksâ of illegal weapons to Saddam having the intent to obtain such weapons and being in breach of UN resolutions.
âThat was not, however, the explanation for military action he had given before the conflict,â Chilcot said.
Iraq remains in chaos. Islamic State controls large areas of it and 250 people died on Saturday, in Baghdadâs worst car bombing since the US-led coalition toppled Saddam. The inquiryâs purpose was for the British government to learn lessons from the invasion and occupation.
âWe cannot turn the clock back, but we can ensure that lessons are learned and acted on,â Britainâs prime minister, David Cameron, a Conservative, told parliament.
âIt is crucial to good decision-making that a prime minister establishes a climate in which itâs safe for officials, and other experts, to challenge existing policy and question the views of ministers, and the prime minister, without fear or favour.â
Jeremy Corbyn, the Labour leader, told parliament the war was an act of aggression based on a false pretext and it had fuelled terrorism.
Key findings
- Judgments about the severity of the threat posed by Iraqâs weapons of mass destruction â WMD â were âpresented with a certainty that was not justifiedâ;
- There was âlittle timeâ to properly prepare three military brigades for deployment in Iraq, the risks were not âproperly identified or fully exposedâ to ministers, resulting in âequipment shortfallsâ;
- Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were under-estimated;
- Planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddamâs fall were âwholly inadequateâ;
- Mr Blairâs government failed to achieve its stated objectives.