State Papers – Day One: US call for Olympic boycott over Afghan war

In the light of current difficulties in Afghanistan, it is ironic that the country was very much in the news in 1980, because forces from the Soviet Union were occupying the country.

On January 20, 1980, US President Jimmy Carter sent a telegram informing the Taoiseach he had requested the president of the US Olympic Council (USOC) to “work with other national Olympic committees to seek the transfer or cancellation of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games unless the Soviet Union withdraws its troops from Afghanistan within the next month”.

“I believed that such action is necessary to support the position of the United Nations General Assembly, to convince the Soviet Government and people of the world’s outrage at Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and to deter future aggression,” Carter wrote. “I urge the USOC to propose that the games either be transferred to another site such as Montreal or to multiple sites, or be cancelled for this year.”

He added that “the security of our nation and the peace of the world” were at stake.

Next day when US Ambassador William Shannon delivered Carter’s message for the Taoiseach, he stressed that Washington viewed Soviet actions in Afghanistan “as the most serious security challenge since World War II”. He was suggesting this crisis was graver than the Berlin airlift, Korean War, Hungarian Rising, the Suez Crisis, or even the Cuban Missile Crisis.

When leaders of the nine European Community nations met in Rome on January 23, the governments were reluctant to intervene, because there was a general view “that President Carter’s move may not have been well advised.” There was concern over his lack of consultation, and they thought his move was “clearly related” to the forthcoming presidential election.

Carter needed “to show himself as strong and tough-minded in his election campaign rather than the moralistic and inept leader which he had appeared to be for some years,” according to Noel Dorr, the secretary general of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

If the EC leaders had to choose between supporting either the boycott, or the Olympics in Moscow, however, most felt “their governments may in the end have to support the US position”.

Ireland’s objective was “to limit any possible loss of goodwill in the USA while preserving what we find valuable in our relations with the USSR.”

Ireland had recently been enjoying a distinct increase in trade with the Soviet Union. The value of Irish exports to the country had increased from £1.8 million in 1976 to £20.5m in the first 10 months of 1979.

The Government openly supported the US by backing the resolution at the UN General Assembly and the decision of EC leaders calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Like a number of other countries, Ireland essentially wished to appear to be supporting Carter without sacrificing any trade.

“If we are seen to be rebutting his personal approach and if he is re-elected,” the Department of Foreign Affairs warned, “there could be implications for our relations with the US over the next few years.”

The Olympics had a particular significance here in that Irishman Lord Killanin was president of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). He appeared to get on well with Soviet authorities.

“Lord Killanin, as I gather from him, always makes a special effort to understand the Soviet point of view,” Irish ambassador Edward Brennan reported from Moscow. Killanin seemed to get on well with deputy premier Ignaty Novikov, who was in charge of the Olympic preparations.

“Novikov and the other Russians were loud in their praise of the way Lord Killanin had dealt with the many ticklish questions put to him,” Brennan wrote. Even though Killanin had already indicated he was stepping down after the forthcoming games, Novikov stated that the Soviet Union would like to see him to stay as IOC president.

“This was not only a very high tribute to Lord Killanin but an indication of their preference among the candidates,” Brennan added. “The Russians never say anything out of sheer politeness.”

“The International Olympic Committee cannot solve the political problems of the world,” Killanin said at the opening of the Winter Olympics in Lake Placid, New York, a few weeks later. He described the threatened boycott as the “most serious challenge to the Olympic Games.” The IOC Executive Council voted unanimously to go ahead with the Moscow games.

In the following months the US kept up the pressure for a boycott. There were protestations of support from various governments, including the Irish government, but most were not prepared to back up their words with punitive action.

Irish diplomats kept a close eye on the attitude of friendly governments especially prime ministers Malcolm Fraser of Australia, Margaret Thatcher of Britain, and Joe Clark of Canada. All strongly backed Carter’s call for the boycott.

Clark even promised that Canada would “refrain from grain sales to the USSR in excess of normal and traditional levels.” But Australian critics of the boycott noted that their country’s wheat sales to the USSR were worth A$53.8m in March 1980 alone, and A$264m in the previous nine months, compared to just A$15.2m for the nine months ending in March 1979.

Thatcher could not see the absurdity of calling on the athletes to boycott the games while continuing to trade with the Soviet Union. “It is ironic that we live in a free country but our athletes are going to a county which denied freedom of choice and is indeed extinguishing lives,” she told Charlie Haughey when they met at Downing Street in May.

“I felt very strongly that this was the only way we could bring home to the Russians how we see the invasion of Afghanistan. But the athletes tend to say, ‘why do you continue to trade with the Soviet Union?’

“That is, of course very different,” Thatcher continued. “After all the Olympic athletes are amateurs and it is not a matter of livelihood for them.”