Lack of reliable agents exposed
MI6 did not generally have agents with first-hand inside knowledge of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear, chemical, biological or ballistic missile weapons programmes, it said.
Reports from one of MI6’s main intelligence sources had now been withdrawn, while two other main sources were now regarded as “unreliable”.
The authors also said that reports from a liaison service on Iraq’s production of biological weapons was “seriously flawed”.
Iraq was a “very difficult” intelligence target - particularly since the departure of United Nations weapons inspectors in 1998 - and information about its programmes was sparse.
The Butler report criticised the validation of the information from the sources that were available.
It found that a high proportion of the intelligence from MI6’s human sources had been withdrawn or thrown into doubt since last year’s war.
One reason for this was the “over-reliance” on dissident sources who had their own motives for exaggerating the dangers posed by the Iraqi regime.
The report’s authors said they did not believe this was a major cause of the weakness in intelligence.
It identified the length of the reporting chains as a factor in why so much intelligence was unreliable. It also said more credence was given to untried agents than would normally have been the case because of the scarcity of information.
And it said many agents were asked to report on issues which were “well beyond” their usual territory, leading to reports which were “speculative”.
The report said the “brutalities” of Saddam’s regime had made it difficult for MI6 to recruit and run reliable agents in Iraq.
But it said that the intelligence failings were due, in part, to weaknesses in the application of MI6’s validation procedures.
Budget cuts in the mid-1990s had weakened MI6’s internal processes to ensure the quality of agents.
The report concluded that it was of “vital importance” that human intelligence sources were effectively scrutinised.




