Robert Skidelsky: Collective reaction to terror intensifies in spite of lower threat
The number of deaths from terrorism has fallen in Europe, but fear of it is being used to justify for more intrusive security measures, writes
There was, all too predictably, no shortage of political profiteering in the wake of Novemberâs London Bridge terror attack, in which Usman Khan fatally stabbed two people before being shot dead by police.
In particular, the Britainâs prime minister, Boris Johnson, swiftly called for longer prison sentences and an end to âautomatic early releaseâ for convicted terrorists.
In the two decades since the September 11, 2001, terror attacks in the US, terrorism has become the archetypal moral panic in the Western world.
The fear that terrorists lurk behind every corner, plotting the wholesale destruction of Western civilisation, has been used by successive British and US governments to introduce stricter sentencing laws and much broader surveillance powers â and, of course, to wage war.
In fact, terrorism in Western Europe has been waning since the late 1970s.
According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), there were 996 deaths from terrorism in Western Europe between 2000 and 2017, compared to 1,833 deaths in the 17-year period from 1987-2004, and 4,351 between 1970 (when the GTD dataset begins) and 1987.
Historical amnesia has increasingly blotted out the memory of Europeâs homegrown terrorism: Sectarian terrorism in the North, the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, Basque and Catalan terrorism in Spain, and Kosovar terrorism in the former Yugoslavia.
The situation is clearly different in the US â not least because the data are massively skewed by the 9/11 attacks, in which 2,996 people died.
But even if we ignore this anomaly, it is clear that, since 2012, deaths from terrorism in America have been rising steadily, reversing the previous trend.
Much of this âterrorismâ, however, is simply a consequence of having so many guns in civilian circulation.
To be sure, Islamist terrorism is a real threat, chiefly in the Middle East. But three points need to be emphasised.
First, Islamist terrorism â like the refugee crisis â was largely a result of the Westâs efforts, whether hidden or overt, to achieve âregime changeâ.
Second, Europe is in fact much safer than it used to be, partly because of the influence of the EU on governmentsâ behaviour, and partly because of improved anti-terrorist technology.
Thirdly, and according to the Government Accountability Office of the United States, 73% of violent extremist incidents that resulted in deaths after September 11, 2001 were caused by right-wing, white extremist groups
Yet, as the number of deaths from terrorism declines (at least in Europe), alarm about it grows, offering governments a justification for introducing more security measures.
This phenomenon, whereby our collective reaction to a social problem intensifies as the problem itself diminishes, is known as the âTocqueville effectâ.
In his 1840 book, Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville noted that, âit is natural that the love of equality should constantly increase together with equality itself, and that it should grow by what it feeds onâ.
Moreover, there is a related phenomenon that we can call the Baader-Meinhof effect: Once your attention is drawn to something, you begin to see it all the time.
These two effects explain how our subjective estimates of risk have come to diverge so sharply from the actual risks we face.
In fact, the West has become the most risk-averse civilisation in history.
Modern humanity acts upon and controls the natural world, and therefore calculates the degree of danger it poses.
As a result, tragedy need no longer be a normal feature of life. German sociologist Niklas Luhmann argued that once individual actions came to be seen to have calculable, predictable, and avoidable consequences, there was no hope of returning to that pre-modern state of blissful ignorance, wherein the course of future events was left to the fates.
As Luhmann cryptically put it: âThe gate to paradise remains sealed by the term risk.â
Economists, too, believe that all risk is measurable, and therefore controllable. In that respect, they are bedfellows with those who tell us security risks can be minimised by extending surveillance powers and enhancing the techniques by which we gather information about potential threats.
A risk, after all, is the degree to which future events are uncertain, and, as Claude Shannon, the founder of information theory, wrote, âinformation is the resolution of uncertaintyâ.
There is a clear benefit to being safer, but it comes at the price of an unprecedented intrusion into our private lives.
Our right to information privacy, now guaranteed by the EUâs General Data Protection Regulation, is increasingly in direct conflict with our demand for security.
Omnipresent devices that see, hear, read, and record our behaviour produce a glut of data from which inferences, predictions, and recommendations can be made about past, present, and future actions.
In the face of the adage âknowledge is powerâ, the right to privacy withers. Furthermore, there is a conflict between safety and well-being.
To be perfectly safe is to eliminate the cardinal human virtues of resilience and prudence. The perfectly safe human is therefore a diminished person.
For both these reasons, we should stick to the facts and not give governments the tools they increasingly demand to win the âbattleâ against terrorism, crime, or any other technically avoidable misfortune that life throws up.
A measured response is needed. And when it comes to the chaos and mess of human history, we should recall Heraclitusâs observation that âa thunderbolt steers the course of all things.â






