In some cases two are better than one

THE celebrated 19th-century commentator on the British constitution, Walter Bagehot, reached a negative verdict on bicameralism: “with a perfect lower house it is certain that an upper house would be scarcely of any value”.

Except in federal states, where the case for a second chamber to represent the component units of the federation is strong, it is difficult to justify bicameralism. Advocates of second chambers list two advantages: They facilitate representation of special groups, and they enhance the efficiency of parliament by improving the quality of legislation.

The problem with the representation argument is that if a second chamber is selected on a different basis from the first (which is designed to represent the whole people), it lacks moral authority; but if it is elected on the same basis it may be tempted to challenge the first chamber.

There is also a risk the “special interests” in the second chamber are in fact “vested interests”, determined to protect their privileges, as in the case of hereditary peers in the UK House of Lords up to 1999.

The efficiency argument is also unconvincing. Second chambers may be able to draw on wider expertise and to spend more time considering legislation than first chambers, but old arguments about the superior “wisdom” of second chambers cut no ice in the era of highly organised parties and professionalised politics.

There are other ways of ensuring adequate consideration of legislation, such as reinforcing the procedures of the first chamber, developing its committee system, and making more extensive use of other agencies, such as courts and head of state.

Not surprisingly, then, second chambers are more the exception than the rule, and have been declining over the decades. In early 2012, only one third of unitary states (57 out of 165) had a second chamber.

Of these:

* 24 were designed to represent mainly the territories of the state (commonly elected by local councillors);

* 13 were similar in structure to the first chamber (though typically elected by means of a different formula);

*m 18 were primarily nominated bodies.

The remaining two, Seanad Éireann and the Slovene National Council, were supposed to represent sectional or “vocational” interests“, though the former was elected mainly by local councillors.

The promoters of Seanad abolition have not advanced any principled critique of bicameralism. The Fine Gael campaign highlights three main arguments: Saving money, eliminating 60 politicians, and ridding us of an unreformable body.

While the actual cost of running the Seanad is disputed, even if the total is €20m this is a modest charge for a central component in Ireland’s constitutional framework. It represents about 0.04% of total state expenditure, and should be compared with the approximately €7m to run the office of the president, which nobody proposes to abolish.

THE argument Ireland needs “fewer politicians” has undoubted populist appeal. But when advanced by politicians it has overtones of a cynical “dog eat dog” approach. This self-deprecatory message is not likely to help the reputation of the political class at a time when this has already been dented by past policy errors.

The allegation the Seanad has failed to reform itself notwithstanding 12 reports proposing reform is entirely misleading. To start with, the tale of 12 reports is a myth.

!Only three of the 12 reports have a bearing on current Seanad reform: The 2004 report itself, and two earlier reports of Oireachtas committees, in 1997 and 2002.

Even if these reports had converged in recommending a single formula for the composition of the Seanad, there would be nothing useful the Seanad could do about it. It is the Government that drives reform, and it is disingenuous to accuse the Seanad of failing to reform itself.

Government inaction is illustrated by one remarkable failure. In a 1979 referendum, an overwhelming majority voted to allow a redistribution of the six university seats in the Seanad. But no action has been taken to implement this.

A principled case for abolishing Ireland’s second chamber could easily be made. In current political circumstances, though, many are sceptical of the wisdom of abolishing the Seanad in the absence of other structural reforms — or, worse still, in circumstances where other changes are reducing the answerability of the Government.

Bagehot disapproved of bicameralism in an ideal constitution but made an exception when the representative house was not doing its job properly. In these circumstances, a revising chamber was, he said, “extremely useful, if not quite necessary”. This judgment may well be appropriate in relation to the debate on the Seanad.

* John Coakley’s Reforming Political Institutions: Ireland in Comparative Perspective, is published by the Institute of Public Administration.