Russian poker face only reveals Cyprus peril
In his Financial Times blog, Paul Murphy said after the Cypriot finance minister, Michael Sarris, returned empty-handed from Moscow: âMedvedev and co could not have played a worse hand during this crisis â and itâs not immediately clear why.â
His point is that the most likely outcome right now â he calls it âpopping the red pillâ â is that big depositors at Laiki Bank (read: Rich Russians) are likely to lose some 40% of their money. Since that will make Russia very unhappy, why is Russia doing nothing to prevent it?
I donât pretend to understand Russian politics, but this move seems to me to be a classic high-risk, high-aggression play; think of Russian prime minister Dmitry Medvedev as a geopolitical hedge-fund manager or poker player, and it begins to make a bit more sense.
Firstly, itâs worth noting that Russia is actually moving backwards on the amount of help itâs likely to extend to Cyprus. When the bailout plan was first announced, it included Russia extending its existing âŹ2.5bn loan to the country by five years, as well as reducing that loanâs interest rate. Now, Russia is refusing to agree even to that.
More generally, Russia is taking an absolutist stance to Cyprus: âNo, we wonât restructure the money you owe us. No, we wonât buy a bank off you. No, we arenât interested in your natural-gas reserves.â
Underlying it all, of course, is an unspoken â and all the more powerful for being unspoken â physical threat to any Cypriot who causes powerful Russians to lose billions of euros.
Russia knows exactly whoâs sitting around this poker table: Itâs not Cyprus that theyâre playing, itâs the EU. If Russia were to enter into good-faith negotiations with Cyprus right now, that would help the EU by reducing the amount of EU support that the island nation needs.
Moreover, any deal that Russia made with Cyprus could be vetoed by Germany, the Eurogroup, the ECB, or even the IMF. Russia is too big and too important to try to do deals which could be forcibly unravelled on a German finance ministerâs whim.
And while we have a pretty good idea of what the Russian prime minister is saying to Sarris in Moscow, we have a much less clear idea of what other Russians are saying to Cypriot policymakers in Nicosia. The Cypriot capital is reportedly full of mysterious Russians right now, and it might not be all that hard for them to nobble a vote in parliament â especially given that just about any vote is going to be massively unpopular with voters.
If parliament does nothing, then Cyprus collapses; weâre going to need a big show of political unity to prevent that. And so far, the only political unity weâve seen has been against the bailout, not for it.
Which brings me to the blue pill, as described by Murphy. Cyprus has a binary choice: Become a gimp state for Russian gangster finance, or turn fully towards Europe, close down much of its shady banking sector, and rebuild its economy on something more sustainable.
Murphy says itâs âobviousâ which choice Cyprus should take. But itâs probably much less obvious to parliament. And what exactly does Murphy have in mind when he talks about an economy based âon something more sustainableâ?
Natural gas? Given Cypriot national ties, itâs easy to see which company has pole position in terms of getting that mandate: Gazprom.
Thus there is a real possibility that Cyprus will end up taking the blue pill rather than the red pill, and become a Russian client state, either inside or outside the euro.
After all, Cyprus is a Eurogroup client state right now, and has wound up in this sorry place as a result. If it pops the red pill, it will have essentially no autonomy for the foreseeable future in any case.
Itâs also easy to imagine that Putinâs Russia views its relations with the EU as something of a zero-sum game. Russia has a 150-year obsession with acquiring influence, if not outright control, over warm-water ports in southern Europe. Looked at that way, the loss of Cyprus from the EU to Russia would be a clear loss to the EU and a clear win for Russia.
Which, in turn, might explain why Russia is doing absolutely nothing which might help the EU. Itâs making a risky and aggressive move to essentially seize Cyprus from the hands of Europe, and to gain an important geopolitical foothold in the eurozone.
The downside to that move is that if Cyprus pops the red pill, then a lot of Russians could lose a lot of money. But even if that does happen, Russia will be waiting on the sidelines with a lot of new money if needed, ready to snap up Cypriot assets at fire-sale prices.
Thereâs no doubt the best outcome for Cyprus and for the EU would be for Russia to extend its help now, before Cyprusâs banks reopen tomorrow.
But Russia doesnât want whatâs best for Cyprus, or for the EU. Russia wants whatâs best for Russia. And the way itâs acting reminds me of nothing so much as a classic Wall Street bear raid, designed to drive down the price of something you want to be able to pick up very, very cheap. Whatâs more, it might even work.





