As the ayatollahs fight to the finish, pray for the Iranian demonstrators

As the protests continue, however, Mousavi might be propelled into a position he never sought: the Mikhail Gorbachev or FW de Klerk of Iran, a member of the ruling establishment who surprises even himself by deviating from the line to the point where the system falls apart

THIRTY years after the Khomeini revolution brought down the Shah and led the Islamic Republic to power, a new generation in Iran is now fomenting a shake-up whose full ramifications are not yet known.

The similarities appear stark, not just with 1979, but with 1953, when Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq, who had swept into power following a large-scale strike of workers in the oil industry, forced the young Shah to flee the country. Very soon, Mosaddeq was himself overthrown following riots that were organised by the CIA and British intelligence, and the Shah was restored to the Peacock Throne. Many Iranians, perfectly understandably, have never gotten over it.

Will this round of mass demonstrations – unprecedented in the history of the Islamic Republic – lead to regime change, though? Maybe, maybe not. What is certain is that giving your picture on Facebook a green tinge won’t make a jot of difference.

The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khameini, initially hailed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s re-election as a “divine assessment”. Now few, even within the regime, dispute the fact that the recent Iranian presidential election was flawed.

But how flawed? Some reports suggest the process was no worse than in so many other countries. Others predicted that Ahmadinejad would only do well if turnout was low – and yet 85% of the population voted.

There were other disturbing aspects. The fact that the interior ministry declared the results just two hours after the polls closed – far faster than ever before – points to either lightning efficiency or foul play. What’s more, regions of the country considered deeply hostile to the Islamic Republic or to Ahmadinejad, including even his challenger Mir Hossein Mousavi’s home town, were declared to have backed the current president.

Is it any wonder middle-class Tehranis and the émigré community demonstrating outside Iranian embassies suspect wholesale forgeries were planned in advance? So the anger is real. Whether the differences between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi are similarly profound is more debatable. They “may not be as great as has been advertised,” cautions President Obama.

After all, like their respective patrons, Khamenei and former president Rafsanjani respectively, they are Khomeini protégés. Mousavi was prime minister under Khomeini’s leadership, running the country through most of its bloody and destructive war with Iraq. Meanwhile, Mohsen Rezaie, another of the presidential candidates leading demands for an electoral rerun, was for 16 years the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, the regime’s stick to beat down opponents. So whether Mousavi’s goal is to change the character of the Islamic regime, or whether current events simply represent a tug-of-war for influence within the regime is an open question.

As the demonstrations continue, however, Mousavi might be propelled into a position he never sought: the Mikhail Gorbachev or FW de Klerk of Iran, a member of the ruling establishment who surprises even himself by deviating from the line to the point where the system falls apart.

What Mousavi and Rafsanjani originally wanted was a conservative “coup” of their own to replace Ahmadinejad at the top of the Islamic state. So limited were their ambitions that most of them seemed initially resigned to accept the disputed election results.

The supporters who have rallied around Mousavi have other goals in mind, however. Theirs is a coalition of students and young people whose future holds limited opportunities for meaningful employment, women who have been marginalised from the public landscape and an educated semi-westernised section of society that has taken up the cause of human rights. They are not willing to settle for the crumbs that have been sent their way by Khamenei, who is now proposing a partial recount of the votes, perhaps even new elections. They want freedom and democracy.

Since the mass protests broke out from below, they have effectively invited Mousavi and his timid allies to assume the leadership of the opposition movement.

Khamenei, Ahmadinejad, and the Revolutionary Guards, the pillar on which the regime’s power rests, all understand the dilemma with which they now have to deal: if they give the order brutally to crack down on the riots, which have already spread to other cities, they are liable to ignite an even bigger conflagration. If they do not suppress the demonstrations, they will be perceived as weaklings who blinked first. In turn, this could whet the appetites of the demonstrators, perhaps moving them to issue more demands.

Iran has reached a fork in the road. The direction in which it heads now depends on the working class. If the demonstrators gain the support of the poor, the texture of the campaign will take on a completely new dimension. The demand for freedom will be coupled with the demand for bread.

Khamenei’s speech at Friday prayers made it clear that although its authority has been badly corroded in recent years, the regime plans to fight for its life and will act to suppress the protests. So, expect more violence in the days ahead. That tactic only gave greater impetus to the crowds in 1979.

But even if the regime does succeed in the short term, it would be foolish to take popular opinion for granted ever again. Equally, this trampling of democracy may bring about a much harsher approach by the US and EU if the dialogue over the Iranian nuclear programme fails and the sanctions are intensified. That means economic sanctions that affect the wellbeing of the Iranian public, at the expense of the relentless development of nuclear weapons, might have greater weight. Conversely, that lessens the danger of a military confrontation in the future.

A VICTORY by the moderates, though, even if they are loathe to engage in far-reaching change and are just as committed to the nuclear project, might make Iran more open to the west, even if this outcome is achieved at a high price in terms of turning a blind eye to increasing Iranian influence in the region. That will be a worry for Sunni regimes like Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Successful revolutions always look impossible beforehand and inevitable in hindsight, yet the barriers to overthrowing the regime still appear considerable. There are at least four Irans: the quasi-democracy that the US was happy to engage with after the Iraq war, the “axis of evil” Iran, the Iran of the haute couture headscarf and the older, conservative rural Iran that provides the bulwark of support for the existing order.

As the weakening regime vacillates between lashing out and giving ground, the outcome is unpredictable. But the obvious danger is that the masses in Tehran – so far ahead of their supposed leaders in their demands for greater freedom – are reduced to a stage army, while the power struggle is contained within the corrupt and collapsing elite. By all accounts, Tehran is normally a peaceful, low-crime city, where the main danger is from the appalling, eye-watering pollution and manic car drivers. Not any more, now the ayatollahs are fighting for their very political lives.

Hope and pray for the demonstrators. Just don’t fiddle with Facebook.