Defence gaps mean sabotage of gas energy supply could be 'crippling' for Ireland

LÉ George Bernard Shaw amongst others docked at the naval base in Haulbowline. File picture: Eddie O'Hare

Sabotage of electricity connectors or gas pipelines to Ireland or of a planned floating gas reserve could have "crippling" costs due to the "austere" state of Irish maritime military assets, a security expert has warned.

Brendan Flynn of University of Galway said that while such sabotage attacks might "seem implausible"  to Irish people, they could form part of a "crude" strategy to deter European proposals against Russia.

Writing in the Defence Forces Review 2025, Mr Flynn said Ireland needs military assets — sensors, drones, naval patrol ships, and patrol aircraft — and clear and coordinated leadership.

The review is published by the Defence Forces in collaboration with Dublin City University.

Mr Flynn said that in contrast to sabotage of sub sea internet cables that "far greater losses" would arise if sub-sea gas and electricity connector pipelines were sabotaged.

There are two electricity connectors between Ireland and Wales and a third due next year. 

There are two gas pipelines from Scotland to Ireland that provide almost 80% of Ireland’s gas supplies.

In addition, Mr Flynn said that liquified natural gas is increasingly stored in "large and vulnerable" floating storage regasification units (FSRU).

The politics lecturer said Ireland has plans for a unit near Tarbert, Co Limerick. 

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He said they can be easily targeted: "A hybrid attack of these assets may seem implausible to us, but could be rationalised as crude signalling."

He said removing sanctions is a Russian priority and that hybrid attacks in Irish-controlled waters would be a way of escalating tensions away from the main site of conflict.

Mr Flynn said mavic-type drones, which are used by militaries, could destroy an FSRU, which cost, at least, over $100m (€87m).

"Even a limited attack could create crippling costs through marine insurance markets, which are very sensitive to war risks," he said.

He said the Russian shadow fleet of oil tankers present risks: "As of mid-2025, Russian Navy warships have begun occasional "escorts" of such vessels, which poses obvious scope for an armed incident. 

"A significant number [over 200] of such vessels have been documented transiting through Ireland’s Exclusive Economic Zone in the first half of 2025, which poses a significant challenge for Ireland’s relatively austere maritime presence and monitoring capabilities.” 

Also writing in the review, Commandant Killian Doyle, of the Communication and Information Services, said Ireland’s policy of military neutrality was "not a shield in cyberspace".

He said: “The 2021 ransomware attack on Ireland’s HSE had strategic impact; paralysing hospitals, exposing data, and demanding a national and international response. 

"These complexities highlight the ongoing uncertainty surrounding attribution, whether the assault was state-orchestrated, criminal, or any combination thereof, and serve as a salient reminder that Ireland’s cyber exposure is real, growing, and far beyond the reach of passive neutrality."