Clear property crash warning ignored, inquiry hears
And in 2007, as the economy was at a tipping point, warning calls made by Frank Brown were also not heeded and a more positive outlook was put out by the institution, it was alleged.
In a statement to the banking inquiry, Mr Brown claimed that, as the economy became more fragile, the âlanguage of concern was going in the opposite directionâ, with warnings being toned down by senior management before they were published.
He said that financial stability reports which he produced from 2004 onwards were âcensoredâ, âwatered downâ, and warnings were kept from the public.
Although financial institutions were in a relatively healthy state in 2004, he expressed concern that house prices had risen significantly and could lead to a bubble followed by a bust down the line.
He said a line in his report that year â âthe prospects for a soft landing for Irish house prices are not favourableâ â was taken out of the final draft by bank officials.
âContrary to popular view, the relevant decision makers were informed in good time before the financial crisis about the imminent and growing risk of a property bubble and were enabled to make the appropriate decisions based on such information,â said Mr Brown.
He said his reports were ignored as the Central Bank was more concerned about getting the âtoneâ of a financial stability report ârightâ as opposed to âflagging the real dangers overhanging the financial systemâ.
Mr Brown said not all the risks emerging from the research and analysis survived to the stage of the joint board of the Central Bank and less so to the public domain.
âThose that did were watered down by the time they arrived at this stage. Others appear to have been censored before they might have come into the public domain,â he said.
He said that, in the months leading up to the property crash, senior management again âfailed to acknowledge the weight of results of research and analysis supporting misalignment in house pricesâ.
âIn effect, it wasted the last opportunity, however belatedly, to call a hard landing, which would have focused all of the financial risk [that] was clearly flagged,â he said.
âAlthough requested to conduct research and analysis, the results of this work was neglected and ignored for the most part by senior management.â
Former director general of the Central Bank Liam Barron, refuted the âgrave accusationsâ that appear to âhave the effect of protecting [Mr Brownâs] own reputationâ.
âFrank Brownâs suggestion is patently incorrect and factually unsustainable.â
Former Central Bank governor John Hurley also refuted a number of the points made by Mr Brown.



