Call for ‘intrusive’ oversight of informant system
The watchdog said the absence of rules on the use of informants in Garda operations meant there were no limits on what criminality informants were authorised to engage in.
The Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission (GSOC) wants direct access to the Garda Pulse comp-uter system “immediately”, because of “unacceptable” delays in accessing records and documentation.
The recommendations follow a four-year probe into allegations of collusion between gardaí and convicted drug dealer Kieran Boylan in the supply and movement of drugs.
The body sent a detailed report on the probe to Justice Minister Alan Shatter last Friday and to Garda Commissioner Martin Callinan on Tuesday. A special report was also sent yesterday to Mr Shatter, who then published it.
The 12-page special report said the investigation was set up on Oct 18, 2008. This was after politicians raised concern at the withdrawal of drug charges against Mr Boylan.
The report said a file was sent to the DPP on Dec 13 last and that on Apr 23, she directed against prosecution. GSOC did not say if reasons were given.
The report said the bulk of its investigation related to a period when the intelligence source management system (ISMS) was in operation (Jun 2002 to Apr 2006). This was replaced by the covert human intelligence source (CHIS) system, on foot of the Morris Tribunal. Some of its investigation covered the CHIS period.
The report said that senior Garda management had acknowledged that “no training” was provided generally to Garda members under ISMS and there was a “culture of non-adherence”.
It said neither ISMS nor CHIS covered the eventuality of an informant simultaneously providing information to more than one law-enforcement agency.
The report said not all the deficiencies in ISMS were remedied by CHIS.
It said gardaí had not advised it of any guidance it had regarding “participating informants”, ie, informants active in criminality.
“The absence of such mechanisms for the use, in Garda operations, of ‘participating informants’ creates significant risks as, in the Ombudsman Commission’s view, it is not possible to effectively manage and place parameters upon the extent to which such individuals are authorised to participate in criminality,” the report said.
It said it was unclear whether gardaí seek the advice of the DPP in this regard and called for clarity.
The report said there were “inconsistencies” in access to sensitive intelligence afforded to gardaí, with “inappropriate distribution” of intelligence.
“This can lead to dysfunction within the investigative structure of the Garda Síochána, resulting, in part, to a culture of mistrust and competitiveness amongst national units of the Garda Síochána.”
The ombudsman said there was a question mark on its oversight given that it cannot independently access Garda computer records.
*Review Garda training in handling informants.
*Ensure accurate and complete recording.
*Guidance for gardaí dealing with informants who are not registered.
*New and specific breach of discipline for those not complying with rules.
*Independent and intrusive oversight of Garda informant system.
*Guidance on use of “participating informants” (informants who are active criminals).
*High level of scrutiny of participating informants.
*Review interaction of specialist national units.
*Ombudsman to be given independent access to Garda computer system.
*Measures, possibly legislation, to ensure full disclosure by gardaí.
I very much welcome the fact that the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission investigation has now concluded and that the Director of Public Prosecutions has directed that there should be no prosecutions in relation to this case.
It is very important in considering the findings of the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission that sight is not lost of that key point. I note also that the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission have decided not to pursue a disciplinary investigation.
It is a matter of great regret to me and to An Garda Síochána generally that the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission regard the reason for the long delay in carrying out their investigation as being due mainly to difficulties which they perceived were experienced in obtaining evidence from An Garda Síochána.
The Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission decided not to give An Garda Síochána an opportunity to respond to these findings in advance so that our views could be taken into account and that we could address comprehensively any misunderstandings or issues which may have arisen. It would ... have provided a proper opportunity, in fairness, to have a full picture.
I have been concerned that existing protocols for the exchange of information do not work in the interests of either An Garda Síochána or the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission in ensuring a speedy outcome to investigations and we have been in intensive discussions with the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission to address this issue.
It is clearly vital that neither organisation does anything which would tend to undermine public confidence in the procedures for investigating allegations made against gardaí.
It has been a crucial issue for An Garda Síochána in its efforts to tackle crime and protect the public that the identities of those who provide information to it are protected... The difficult reality is that at times the people who are in possession of useful information have that information because of their background. It is of the utmost importance that An Garda Síochána have a system in place which both ensures that identities of persons are protected, while making sure that appropriate procedures are followed.
Since 2010 a former judge of the High Court has been appointed to monitor the operation of the covert human intelligence [source] system. That judge has reported that An Garda Síochána are in substantial compliance with that system.
I welcome the fact that the GSOC [Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission] investigation has now concluded and that the Director of Public Prosecutions has directed no prosecutions in relation to the case. I note the Commission has decided not to pursue a disciplinary investigation.
Nevertheless, it is... a matter of concern that it took an inordinate amount of time for this investigation to be concluded and that GSOC attribute the main reason for this long delay to difficulties experienced by the investigation team in obtaining evidence from An Garda Síochána. I have asked the Garda commissioner for his observations on the findings of GSOC,in particular, on what they have to say about delays.
Before I received material from GSOC about this particular case, I informed the Dáil last week that I regarded full co-operation by An Garda Síochána with GSOC as extremely important, that protocols relating to the timely provision of information should be adhered to and failures to do so should only occur in exceptional circumstances. The Garda commissioner is in no doubt as to my views on this matter.
It does not serve to encourage public confidence in GSOC for difficulties or arguments to persist privately or publicly about the timely provision of information to GSOC. In the circumstances, when I have received the observations of the commissioner, I intend to convene a meeting with both the Garda commissioner and the [ombudsman] to make sure that any difficulties in this regard have been resolved fully. This is not just in the interests of the public but to ensure where allegations are made against [gardaí] that the matter is resolved quickly.
The report made to me under section 80(5) raises a number of issues about the operation of systems for dealing with the provision of confidential information to the Garda. It is of its nature, and in the public interest, that at times police forces must rely on receiving information from people who do not lead unblemished lives. What is important is that appropriate structures and procedures are in place to deal with what is clearly a complex and sensitive area and that prescribed procedures are fully complied with.
Since 2010 a former judge of the High Court, Mr Thomas Smyth, has been tasked with monitoring the operation of the covert human int-elligence sources (CHIS) operated by An Garda Síochána. Last October the judge reported to me that he was satisfied that [the force was] in substantial compliance in this regard.
The comments and recommendations made by GSOC have raised a series of important issues. They will receive my fullest consideration and, in the first instance, I will consult with both the Garda commissioner and Mr Justice Smyth about them.
