Electronic voting ‘open to abuse’

THE results of a new electronic voting system, set to be used in all future elections, could be altered by rogue hackers, two prominent computer scientists have warned.

Computer scientists Margaret McGaley and J Paul Gibson, from NUI Maynooth, have prepared a report claiming the new system is potentially open to abuse and attack.

The report also claims that the new hi-tech system lacks the necessary safeguards to ensure nothing has been tampered with, among other numerous security concerns.

“It is easy to conceive of a scenario where a hostile person or group has acquired a key and creates a diversion, so that they can gain access to the machine for five minutes,” the report reads.

One of the central concerns centres around the key for the voting system. The key is supposed to give polling staff access to sensitive features on the machine, but is easily copied, the researchers found.

The researchers also point out that any competent programmer can write a code which would display one vote on the screen, while recording and printing different outcomes. “Skilled programmers could insert changes which could affect the outcome of an election, while being very difficult to detect,” the report says.

The report also notes that the opening up of the source code to the general public would make it much more likely that such changes would be detected since the programming community would be able to highlight any problematic areas or loopholes.

However, the system’s source code is not even held by the Government and resides with the system’s manufacturer in Holland, it emerged last week when an Freedom of Information request for the code was denied by the Government.

Another problem noted by the report is the fact that the back-up cartridge is left in the machine after polling has closed. “There is a danger that the backup will be altered or wiped while still in the machine. If the primary cartridge is unusable for some reason, it is vital that the backup cartridge has been kept secure,” the report warns, recommending that backup features should be separated from other parts of the system. While acknowledging that all the recorded concerns might not pose an immediate danger to the system, the report concludes that malicious intent might not even be required to skew the results of an election. “There is no need for malicious attack on the system; human error in the voting machine or count software might be enough to give the wrong result,” it says.

In order to maximise security, the report’s authors recommend that every electronic vote be printed, placed in a ballot box and randomly counted to ensure the system was functioning correctly.