The iron warhorses

I had the idea that the importance of railways in war belonged to the 19th century or, at a stretch, to World War I. Not so, according to Wolmar, who makes a very convincing case that railways were pivotal even in World War II and beyond.

Hitler was very anti-railway, says Wolmar. He was a believer in mechanised road transport and the Nazi state spent so much money on autobahns – at a time when few vehicles could take advantage of them – that the war on the Soviet Union was handicapped because of an acute shortage of rail transport to move the huge quantities of men and supplies needed to fight that war.

The Germans, says Wolmar, could not possibly fight that war successfully by road – especially after even tanks got bogged down in the Russian mud.

This short-sighted approach impoverished the German war machine to the extent that Germany was reduced to using horse transport to supply its troops – long after other armies had consigned the horse to ceremonial duties.

The Nazis would have lost to the Russians anyway, but it’s a point well made.

Similarly, Wolmar has some interesting things to say about the American Civil War, which was the first war in which rail transport had a key role, despite the fact that the railway was in its infancy.

Rail can move enormous numbers of men, machines and munitions compared to road, and this was not lost on both sides in the American Civil War.

One of the results of this realisation was the ability to throw colossal numbers of men into battle – with the consequent high loss of life.

The combined loss of men on both sides was more than 620,000 – the largest loss of life by American troops ever recorded – and that includes World Wars I and II, Korea, Vietnam and Iraq.

Wolmar’s study of railways in war spans more than a century and takes in all the engagements in which railways played a part, including the Crimean War, the American Civil War, both world wars, the Korean War and the Cold War – with its mysterious missile trains.

Engines of War shows that the ‘iron road’ not only made armies far more mobile, but also greatly increased the scale and power of available weaponry. In doing so, wars were fought across wider fronts and over longer timescales, with far deadlier consequences.

One amusing incident, which I have read about elsewhere, though, is missing from this book.

Wolmar refers to the Romney, Hyth and Dymchurch Railway, a 13-mile-long tourist line built to the tiny, 15-inch gauge on the Kent coast, which was requisitioned and fitted with an armoured train sporting anti-tank rifles and machine guns.

But he fails to mention that the miniature line, which carried vital supplies in the invasion zone, confused German airmen who flew much closer to the ground than they intended – with deadly results.

Regrettably, the wartime role of railways on this island in war is also not mentioned, although that history is well-documented. But I suppose the War of Independence, and the Civil War that followed, were mere pinpricks compared to the mass movements of men and munitions in other conflicts.