When one lives through momentous change, it is often easy to fail to notice it happening. Irish banking is a case in point.
Over the past decade or so we have seen a dramatic decline in the number of financial institutions operating in Ireland, and the banking landscape has been totally and utterly transformed.
Names such as Anglo Irish, Irish Nationwide, Rabobank, Danske Bank, and Bank of Scotland have all exited the market, and left our memories in some but not all cases.
Throw in on top of that names such as ICC, ACC, Northern Bank, National Irish Bank, and TSB — and the scale of the change over an even longer time horizon has been even more striking.
After months of speculation and a growing sense of inevitability, the owner of Ulster Bank, NatWest, has announced that it is about to begin a gradual winding down of its operations in the Republic.
This does not come as a surprise as the owners have had to pump in around €17bn to its operations on the island of Ireland since the crash, and it has a cost base that is totally out of kilter with most of the other competitors in the market.
Arguably, it is doubtful if the current operation could ever have been turned into a slick and profitable entity, not least because of the potential cost of the IT investment that Ulster Bank needs.
NatWest also argued that the onerous capital requirements in the Irish banking market render it a less than attractive banking market in which to operate.
It is unlikely to change anytime soon, particularly with the dark spectre of Covid-19 hanging over the Irish economy.
Despite this sense of inevitability, the exit of Ulster Bank from the banking market is bad news on many fronts.
Ulster Bank is the third-largest mortgage and business lender in the Republic.
It has a loan book of around €20bn; it accounts for around 15% of the mortgage market, with mortgage loans of around €14.5bn; it has around €4bn in SME lending, equivalent to 20% of that market; and it holds around €22bn in deposits, including a small one from this author.
Of greater note is the fact that it has been in Ireland since 1860; it has 88 branches in the Republic, employs 2,800 people, and has 1.1m customers.
All in all, it has been and continues to be an influential player in the banking market.
Alas, that is all about to end.
The spin being put on this is that it will be a gradual winding down of the operation and that it will be managed in an "orderly and considered manner", whatever that means.
It is hard to see how it can possibly operate as a proactive force once a decision has been taken to shut it down.
The possible sale of part of the commercial loan book to AIB and of certain SME assets, liabilities, and operations to Permanent TSB is noted, but this will not solve the fundamental problems that will be caused to the Irish economy and Irish society due to the exit.
Indeed, AIB will assume an even more dominant position in the market if it buys these assets.
The sale of some assets to so-called vulture funds is also not a very enticing prospect.
Following the announcement, we have effectively been left with the sort of banking model that those of us of a certain age grew up with.
That is a model where two players dominated the market, and a couple of other smaller ones struggled to gain any real traction.
AIB and Bank of Ireland now control around 60% of the banking market in the Republic and effectively have a duopoly, with all of the negatives that inevitably flow from such a market structure.
With the exit of Ulster, this duopoly domination will be accentuated.
Competition in any market is generally good for the consumer, provided, of course, the competitive structure is regulated properly.
In September 1999, one of the most dramatic developments in the history of the Irish mortgage market occurred when Bank of Scotland entered the market with a variable mortgage rate of 3.69%, compared to an average variable mortgage rate of 5.17% at that time.
The new entrant made a pledge that it would not charge a differential of more than 1.5% above the official ECB rate.
By December of that year, the average variable rate mortgage differential over the ECB rate had narrowed to just 1.14%, compared to 2.86% before the new bank arrived.
This is an example of how competition can help the consumer.
Of course, this competition eventually helped fuel a property bubble and a banking collapse due to a total failure of Central Bank regulation.
The key points are that competition does benefit the consumer, but that competitive forces do need to be properly regulated in any market.
Is it possible that an outside player could now enter the Irish market and shake it up? That's highly unlikely.
The other option would be to create a meaningful third force.
The State still owns 75% of Permanent TSB. So, the question is if this could be somehow linked up with the Post Office and credit unions to create a national banking institution?
It would not be easy and would require considerable capital investment. In addition, the State’s 71% holding in AIB probably complicates the situation.
However, the bottom line is that something needs to be done.
I particularly worry about what might be in store for many smaller businesses who are already struggling as a result of Covid-19 restrictions, and who may struggle to get a bank to support them.
The Government has some big decisions to make, but make them it must.